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Abstract 
 
Using a theoretical model that incorporates asymmetric information and differing 
comparative advantages among lenders, this paper analyzes the impact of lender entry 
on credit access and aggregate net output.  The model shows that lender entry has the 
potential to create a segmented market that increases credit access for those firms 
targeted by the new lenders but potentially reduces credit access for all other firms.  
The overall impact on net output depends on the distribution of firms, the relative 
costs of lenders, and the cost of acquiring information. The model provides new 
insights into the evidence regarding foreign lenders’ entry into emerging markets.  
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1.    Introduction 
By allowing financial institutions in developed countries to lend directly to firms in less 
developed countries (LDCs), open capital markets are generally thought to alleviate domestic liquidity 
constraints, to improve the allocation of credit, and hence to increase aggregate net output.  As a 
result of these potential benefits, many LDCs opened their capital markets in the 1980s and 1990s.  
These openings fostered foreign lenders’ entry into their economies and changed the local 
competitive structure of their financial sectors.  But, the assumption that opening capital markets is 
beneficial has recently come under serious doubt, as empirical studies have repeatedly failed to find a 
consistent relation between foreign lenders’ entry, credit access, and net output in LDCs.1  This lack 
of empirical evidence leads to this paper’s central question: Why might the entry of new lenders, as 
experienced in many LDCs, not increase credit access and aggregate net output?    
In this paper, I show that information asymmetries and competitive interactions between 
lenders with differing comparative advantages provide an answer.  This paper presents a theoretical 
framework that explains how lender entry into an already competitive credit market can affect firms’ 
access to credit when the entering lenders enjoy a different cost of capital and ability to acquire 
information about firms than incumbent lenders.  Specifically, the model assumes entering lenders 
have a lower cost of capital but incumbent lenders determine firms’ quality at a lower fixed screening 
cost per firm.2  Within this framework, it is possible to derive a number of novel predictions.   
First, new lender entry has the potential to induce a segmented credit market that reduces 
credit access for many firms.  The intuition is straightforward. When the cost of acquiring 
information is sufficiently high, a competitive, closed-economy equilibrium may occur in which 
incumbent lenders pool all firms together with a uniform financial contract rather than invest in the 
                                                 
1 For example, Rodrik (1998) and Edison, Levine, Ricci, and Sløk [25] find no effect of open capital markets and 
financial integration.  See Eichengreen [27] for a more detailed review of this literature.  More recent research 
focusing on the specific impact of foreign participation in domestic equity markets and foreign bank entry also 
reaches differing conclusions.  For example, Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad [10] and Henry [36] find positive 
correlations between equity market liberalization and economic performance, whereas Detragiache, Tressel, and 
Gupta [24] and Gormley [32] find foreign bank entry to be negatively related to overall domestic credit. 
2 The comparative advantage of entering lenders—a higher cost of screening but lower marginal cost of funds—
finds substantial support in both the theoretical and empirical literatures on foreign lender entry into LDCs (e.g., see 
Mian [42,43], Micco, Panizza, and Yañez [44], Stein [52]). This evidence is discussed in Section 7.1. 
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costly screening technology.  Relative to the first-best allocation without information asymmetries, a 
pooling equilibrium overfunds low-return firms and underfunds high-return firms.  The entrance of 
new lenders may break this pooling equilibrium.  Because of their lower cost of funds and the fixed 
nature of screening costs, entering lenders may find it worthwhile to acquire information about firms’ 
types so as to offer more competitive contracts to high-return firms capable of profitably investing 
large amounts of capital—a practice commonly called “cream skimming”.   While some firms benefit 
from cream skimming, the resulting separating equilibrium may reduce credit access for other firms 
by changing the set of financial contracts available to them.   
This potential decline in credit access leads to the model’s second implication: Additional 
lenders’ entry has the potential to either increase or reduce net output.  Cream skimming by entering 
lenders increases net output by eliminating the underfinancing of high-return firms capable of 
profitably investing large amounts of capital.  The net output of all other firms, however, may decline. 
Because cream skimming reduces the average quality of firms that accept pooling contracts, these 
contracts may become more expensive, reducing the net output of firms that accept them. In some 
cases, the pooling contract will become unprofitable for lenders to offer, and the remaining firms will 
go unfunded entirely, further reducing net output, if neither the incumbent nor entering lenders find 
it cost-effective to acquire the information necessary to identify the remaining high-return firms.    
The model thus provides a relatively simple explanation as to why open capital markets may 
not necessarily increase overall output in LDCs.  In LDCs with significant information acquisition 
costs, the initial domestic allocation of credit may fail to achieve the first-best allocation because 
domestic lenders optimally choose to pool risks and cross-subsidize losses on low-return firms with 
gains on high-return firms rather than invest in costly screening technologies.  This type of lending 
pattern is a standard problem in emerging economies (Banerjee, Cole, and Duflo [6]).  Because the 
entering foreign lenders have a different cost structure, they will enter via cream skimming, which can 
both redirect credit toward the most profitable firms and reduce the credit access of other firms that 
are less profitable but still have positive net present value (NPV) projects.  
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The underlying mechanism by which net output can decline is quite general.  The model is 
robust to allowing for the renegotiation of contracts after screening reveals firms’ types and to 
allowing lenders to offer a very general set of financial contracts, including contracts that pay low 
return firms to not implement their project.  The model is also robust to various assumptions 
regarding the distribution of firms and assumptions regarding the correlation between firms’ 
productivity and the riskiness of their projects.  Instead, the key assumption of the model is that the 
entering lenders have a different comparative advantage than incumbent lenders; this, combined with 
imperfect information about borrowers, is what drives the potential change in financial contracts 
available in the competitive equilibrium that includes both lenders.  It can also be shown that the 
model generates a decline in net output under wide range of parameter spaces.   
By demonstrating how the impact of lender entry will depend on the distribution of firms, the 
relative costs of lenders, and the cost of acquiring information, the model sheds light on why the 
impact of lender entry might vary across countries and over time.  A decline in net output is more 
likely to occur when the cost of producing information in the local economy is greater.  Thus, 
country-level factors that might affect lenders’ cost of screening, including the quality of the country’s 
local institutions (e.g., weak enforcement of accounting standards or a lack of credit rating agencies), 
will be important.  The model can also be extended to demonstrate that cream skimming and a 
decline in net output is less likely to occur when the comparative advantages of lenders can be 
combined through a merger or syndicated loan.  If allowed, entering lenders will often prefer to 
expand their screening capacity upon entry via acquiring local lenders, and it can be shown that such 
acquisitions will reduce the likelihood of a decline in net output.  The model also sheds light on how 
entry can affect incumbent lenders’ investments in screening capacity and expertise; the arrival of a 
lender with a different comparative advantage can increase incumbent lenders’ incentive to invest in 
screening capacity so as to maintain market share in the open economy.     
The model can explain a number of the existing empirical findings regarding foreign lenders’ 
entry, credit access, and aggregate output in LDCs.  For example, the model can explain why foreign 
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lenders often only target the least informationally opaque, largest, and most profitable firms (Berger, 
Klapper, and Udell [11], Clarke, Cull, Peria, and Sánchez [19] , Gormley [32], Mian [43]) and why this 
cream skimming can be associated with an exit by domestic lenders and overall decline in credit 
(Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Peria [8], Beck and Peria [9], Detragiache, Gupta, and Tressel [24], 
Gormley [32]).  The model also provides an explanation as to why foreign lender entry is not always 
associated with an increase in subsequent economic growth or why financial liberalization might only 
be positively associated with growth in countries in which screening costs are likely less, such as high-
income countries or countries with stronger local institutions (e.g., Arteta, Eichengreen, and Wyplosz 
[5], Edwards [26], Galindo, Micco, and Ordoñez [29], Quinn [48]).  The model can also explain why 
acquiring a domestic lender is a popular mode of entry in many LDCs or why an increase in growth is 
more likely to be observed when such acquisitions are allowed (e.g., Bruno and Hauswald [14], 
Giannetti and Ongena [30]).  
Overall, the analysis provides new insights about the potential consequences of financial 
liberalization and is related to four distinct literatures.  First, the theoretical prediction that lenders 
more efficient at financing certain types of firms may exit following entry by other lenders is similar 
to the argument that competition does not always result in “survival of the fittest” (Bolton and 
Scharfstein [12], Zingales [55]).  The model extends this idea by demonstrating that the exit of the 
seemingly more efficient lender can occur even when the surviving lenders are not shielded from 
potential new entrants or when the exiting lender does not face direct competition in the market in 
which it enjoys an efficiency advantage.  Instead, the exit is driven by additional entry making it 
difficult to offer cross-subsidized products in a market with informational asymmetries.     
Second, this paper is related to the theoretical literature on the effects of competition in the 
presence of imperfect information.  The potential for positive NPV firms to go unfinanced in 
competitive credit markets is similar to that of Stiglitz and Weiss [54], while the potential 
nonexistence of equilibrium and use of cream-skimming strategies is similar to that which can occur 
in models of insurance markets (e.g., Lewis and Sappington [40], Rothschild and Stiglitz [50]). In 
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contrast to these models, where screening occurs through agents’ self-revealing choices from the 
menu of offered contracts, this paper analyzes the effects of competitive screening in a setting where 
lenders are able to acquire and use private information about agents’ types to limit their choice from 
the menu of offered contracts.  Furthermore, rather than analyze the effects of competition among 
agents that share the same screening technology, this paper analyzes how the entry of agents with a 
different comparative advantage can affect the competitive equilibrium.  In this regard, the paper is 
similar to Martin [41], which analyzes how the introduction of a non-exclusive alternative source of 
funds can affect the competitive equilibrium in a market with asymmetric information.   
Third, this paper is related to the growing body of literature concerning the effects of 
competition on lending relationships and credit access (e.g., Boot and Thakor [13], Petersen and 
Rajan [46]).  Rather than look at in increase in competition, however, this paper analyzes how the 
introduction of lenders with a different comparative advantage into an already competitive economy 
affects equilibrium contracts.  This is similar to Dell’Ariccia and Marquez [22] and Sengupta [51], 
which demonstrate that this type of entry can induce segmented credit markets.  However, by 
assuming that incumbent lenders have perfect information about borrower types, neither of these 
papers is able to shed light on why segmented markets might induce declines in credit access.3  While 
this possibility is explored in Detragiache, Gupta, and Tressel [24], this paper differs in that it can 
capture both cases where all firms benefit from entry and cases where some firms do not.  
Additionally, this paper explores how entry will affect lenders’ incentive to expand their screening 
capacity and how the impact on net output will depend on the cost of acquiring information.        
Finally, this paper is related to the growing body of literature on the impact of open capital 
markets and capital inflows.  Despite growing empirical and anecdotal evidence to suggest a potential 
dark side to capital inflows, the argument is often made that lowering entry barriers will be 
                                                 
3 However, in Dell’Ariccia and Marquez [22], lender entry does increase incumbent lenders’ loan portfolio risk, which 
in a more complete model with costly capital could cause a reduced lending capacity for incumbent lenders.  
Although this has the potential to generate adverse effects on credit similar to this paper, their paper does not 
explore this possibility. 
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unambiguously beneficial to the growth of LDCs.4  One possible reason for this apparent disconnect 
is that there is little theoretical understanding as to how capital inflows might adversely affect the local 
economy beyond their potential to reduce financial stability (Agénor [3], Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 
[23], Eichengreen and Leblang [27], Kaminsky and Schmukler [38], Stiglitz [53]).  This paper 
formalizes a theory for why capital inflows may adversely affect the local economy, even in the 
absence of reduced financial stability. The model demonstrates this channel to be quite robust to 
assumptions about local competition, firms, and lenders, while also providing guidance on exactly 
when fostering entry into financial markets will be beneficial. The resulting policy implications of this 
analysis are quite different than those that focus on financial stability. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides the basic setup and 
assumptions of the model.  Section 3 discusses the possible equilibria prior to the new lenders’ entry, 
and Section 4 describes the possible equilibria following entry.  Section 5 then analyzes the factors 
that determine the impact of lender entry on net output.  Section 6 demonstrates the robustness of 
the models’ findings and discusses possible extensions. Section 7 discusses empirical evidence 
regarding the model’s key assumptions and testable predictions.  Finally, Section 8 concludes. 
 
2.    The Basic Model 
2.1    Agents and Technology 
There are two types of agents: firms and lenders.  All agents are risk neutral, and because of 
limited liability, no firm can end with a negative amount of cash.   
The real sector consists of three types of firms, { , , }i A B C , and a continuum, i , of each 
type,  where A B C     is normalized to equal one.  Each type of firm has the ability to implement 
one project of size {1, }I  , where 1  .  If successfully implemented, the project yields a verifiable 
                                                 
4 For example, in a memo to the World Trade Organization on June 6, 2005, delegations from Japan, the United 
States, and European Union argued that “Policies that impede competition, such as entry restrictions and restrictions 
on foreign banks, have been shown to raise the cost of financial services and hurt economic performance.”  WTO 
Document #05-2335.   
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return, *RI r I , where *r is an exogenous cost of capital.  For simplicity, all firms have zero wealth 
and must borrow the entire amount I  from lenders to implement the project.   
Among the three types of firms, there will be one type that lenders always want to finance, 
C (the “cream”), another type they never want to finance, B (the “bad”), and a third type that they 
only want to finance for small projects, A (the “average”).  This is formally established by having the 
three types differ in their ability to implement projects successfully.  If financed, the cream firms 
always succeed with probability 1, regardless of project size, whereas bad firms only succeed with 
probability p .  Projects that only succeed with probability p  have a negative net expected return given 
the cost of funds, *r , such that *pR r .  Average firms, however, implement the smaller project of 
size 1 with certain success, whereas larger projects only succeed with probability p . Given this setup, 
the first-best allocation of credit is achieved and net output is maximized when cream firms are 
financed for projects of size  , average firms for projects of size 1, and bad firms are not financed.5  
The concept of cream firms should be interpreted broadly.  Their ability to successfully 
implement the project of size 1   serves to represent high-return firms capable of profitably 
investing large amounts of capital.  This includes firms able to invest larger amounts of capital today 
or firms able to invest in more future projects.  Hence, cream firms are not necessarily larger in size 
today or able to invest in larger projects.  
The financial sector consists of many perfectly competitive lenders willing to extend capital in 
the amount of {1, }I  .  Without costly investments in the production of information about firms’ 
types, lenders are unable to identify a firm’s type, thus providing the source of information asymmetry 
in the model.  Lenders, however, may invest in a screening technology that perfectly identifies a firm’s 
type.  The cost of this screening technology will capture the severity of the asymmetric information 
                                                 
5 This setup is a specific case of the more general framework, where bad firms succeed with probability pL, cream 
firms succeed with probability pH > pL, and pHR > r* > pLR.  Assuming that pH = 1 and pL < 1 only helps simplify 
expressions, and all subsequent findings and intuition hold in the more general case, which is provided in the online 
Appendix.  Therefore, the implicit negative correlation between risk (variance of output) and productivity in this 
specific case is not necessary for the model’s findings.  In the general case, the implicit correlation between risk and 
productivity can go either way.   
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problem. There will be two types of lenders: “domestic” and “foreign”.  Domestic lenders will be the 
incumbent lenders, whereas foreign lenders will be the potential new entrants into the economy.   
Foreign and domestic lenders will differ in two key ways: Domestic lenders will find it less 
costly to produce information about firms’ types, whereas foreign lenders will enjoy a lower cost of 
funds.  Specifically, domestic lenders can screen at cost 0   per firm, whereas foreign lenders must 
pay *  .6  The lower screening cost for domestic lenders will reflect their prior experience with 
lending to firms in the local economy.  Regarding the cost of funds, foreign lenders have access to an 
unlimited supply of funds at cost, * 0r  , whereas domestic lenders’ have access to an unlimited 
funds at a cost, r , where *r r .  The lower cost of funds for foreign lenders will reflect some 
operational and technological advantage of the new entrant over that of the incumbent lenders.   
The differences in costs provide each lender with a potential comparative advantage. 
Domestic lenders have an information production advantage per firm, whereas foreign lenders have a 
cost of capital advantage per dollar invested.  Thus, for firms with large enough credit needs, a 
foreign lender will have a competitive advantage regardless of whether information production is 
necessary.  To formalize this comparative advantage and the above restrictions on parameter values, 
the following assumptions are made:       
 * *,r r      (A1) 
 
 
*
*r r       (A2) 
  
Assumption (A1) formalizes that domestic lenders have a higher cost of funds and a lower screening 
cost.  Assumption (A2) ensures that projects of size  are sufficiently large to provide foreign lenders 
the competitive advantage in financing these projects.  The assumed comparative advantages of 
domestic and foreign lenders appear to fit well in the context of international capital markets and 
cross-border lending.  This evidence is discussed in Section 7.1.     
                                                 
6 The assumption of a uniform, per firm screening costs greatly reduces the analysis, but is not essential.  All 
subsequent findings will hold in a more general setting in which screening costs are allowed to vary with the scale of 
expected lending to a firm so long as the screening cost does not increase 1-1 with the amount of expected lending.   
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2.2    Timing of Events 
There is no discounting between periods, and the timing of events is as follows: 
0t  : firms discover their type, i , 
1t  : lenders choose their menu of financial contracts, ;F  firms apply for financing, 
2t  : lenders screen applicants and provide capital, I , to successful applicants, 
3t  : project outcomes are realized; financial contracts are settled. 
  
The basic idea of this time line is the following:  Lenders initially choose which menu of 
financial contracts they wish to offer firms.  In doing this, they will choose both which type of 
financial contracts to offer and to which firms they will offer these contracts.  Firms then approach 
lenders and apply for their preferred financial contract from the menu of available contracts.  If the 
contract is designated for firms of a specific type, the lenders invest in information production and 
screen applicant firms to verify their type, and financing is provided to successful applicants.  Finally, 
project outcomes are realized and all financial contracts are settled. 
 
2.3    Financial Contracts and Strategies 
Let jF represent the menu of contracts offered by lender j , where 
,I k
jF  denotes a financial 
contract from lender j in amount I designated for firms of type {0, , , }k A B C .  When 0k  , the 
contract is unscreened and available to all firms, regardless of type, but for 0k  , the lender acquires 
information about firms’ types and the contract is only available to firms for which screening by the 
lender reveals i k .7  Each contract is a mapping of the observable output from the project into a 
payment for the firm.  Specifically, :{0, }F RI  . Each type of contract maps into a nonnegative 
payment because firms have no initial wealth and cannot receive a negative payment.  Moreover, it is 
important to note that this mapping spans the universe of potential contracts, and hence the concept 
of a “lender” used here is very general and encompasses debt, equity, or any mixture thereof.   
                                                 
7 The analysis and subsequent findings are qualitatively similar if lenders are allowed to offer nondeterministic 
screening contracts in which screening only occurs with some probability  . 
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A strategy configuration in this economy consists of the set of contracts jF  for each 
lender j L , and the contract choice, ( )f i , for each firm i E .  A firm’s choice is limited to the set 
of contracts offered by lenders,  , or a choice of no contract, ( )f i  .  The equilibrium concept 
used is subgame perfect, and a strategy configuration will be an equilibrium if each lender j  and each 
firm i  is maximizing its expected profits given the strategies of all other agents in the economy. 
The expected profit of a firm i  with financial contract F  can be expressed as 
          | | 1 ( | ) 0F i p i I F RI p i I F     ,   
where  |p i I is the probability of success for a firm of type i  with a project of size I , which is 
determined by the amount of financing associated with the finance contract, F.  
Likewise, the expected profits of lender j lending to firm i with contract F  is  
        ( | ) ( | ) ( ) ( ) ( )j i F p i I R r j I F j S  ,  
where ( )r j  and ( )j represent the cost of funds and screening for lender j ; I represents the amount 
of financing associated with contract F; and 0S  for unscreened contracts and equals one otherwise. 
 Finally, let ( , )F  be the set of firm types that accept the contract offer F when the set of 
available financial contracts is .  In other words, ( , )i F   if and only if ( )f i F .  Given this, the 
economy’s equilibrium is formally defined as 
 
Definition of Equilibrium:  A strategy configuration, ( )f i  for each firm i E  and 
 implied by jF for each lender j L , constitutes equilibrium if and only if   
(1)  given  , each firm i E  chooses ( )f i   to maximize  ( )f ; 
(2) each lender j L  chooses jF to maximize    , ( | )j j ji F i F di , where ( , )ji F   is 
given by condition 1; and 
(3) because of free entry, each lender makes zero profits,    ( , ) ( | ) 0j j ji F i F di . 
The intuition for the equilibrium is as follows.  The first condition states that, given the set of 
all available contracts offered by lenders, each firm in the economy is choosing the financial contract 
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that maximizes their expected profits.  The second condition states that, given each firm’s optimal 
contract choice from the available menu of contracts offered by all lenders, each lender is offering a 
menu of contracts that maximizes their own expected profits.  In other words, no individual lender 
can improve their own profitability by deviating and offering a different set of contracts to firms.  
The third condition arises from free entry; all lenders make zero expected profits in equilibrium. 
Before solving the equilibrium, it is first worth noting the two implicit assumptions being 
made in the model.  These assumptions simplify the initial analysis but are not crucial to results. 
First, I am assuming that all firms implement the project if they receive financing from a 
lender.  In the absence of this assumption, lenders might have an incentive to offer a contract that 
actually pays bad firms to not implement the project.  Whereas a contract that pays bad firms to do 
nothing can never be an equilibrium contract, because each individual lender could improve 
profitability by dropping the contract, this type of contract might be a profitable deviation for lenders 
in an equilibrium in which bad firms accept unscreened contracts and implement projects.  Paying 
bad firms to do nothing may be less costly than allowing them to implement projects.  In reality, this 
deviation is unlikely to be profitable because such payments for doing nothing would induce all 
individuals without projects to seek the same payoff.   This can be easily captured by introducing a 
fourth type of firm that has no project.  So long as the mass of these firms is sufficiently large, an 
unscreened contract that pays a positive amount to borrowers to take no action will not be a 
profitable deviation.  A screened contract that pays bad firms to not implement a project will also not 
be a profitable deviation so long as the cost of screening exceeds the expected loss on bad firms.8 
Second, I am implicitly assuming that lenders can fully commit to their financial contracts in 
two ways.  (1) Lenders will always acquire information about firms’ types and screen financial 
contracts of type 0k  .  This eliminates lenders from deterring bad borrowers by declaring that all 
contracts will be screened, but not actually screening them.  (2) Lenders can fully commit to the initial 
                                                 
8 Acemoglu [1] uses a similar method to eliminate these unrealistic types of contracts, and an extension of the model 
that relaxes this assumption about implementing projects is available in the online Appendix. 
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terms of any contract, F , and their initial menu of contracts, jF .  In other words, there is no 
possibility of renegotiation between lenders and firms after screening reveals a firm’s type, and hence 
firms will have no incentive to misrepresent their type when applying for a screened contract.  
With a few extensions of the model, it can be shown that full commitment by lenders is an 
equilibrium strategy in a repeated game. In a repeated game, full commitment can be accomplished by 
assuming that firms observe whether lenders have violated full commitment in the past and by 
assuming that firms assign a nonzero probability of such lenders doing so again in the future.  With 
these assumptions, deviations from full commitment, which can yield immediate gains, will attract 
applicants in the future that are ex ante unprofitable for the lender to do business with.  The future 
cost of screening these unwanted applicants will exceed the immediate gains and prevent lenders 
from deviating.  For example, consider an equilibrium in which bad firms are not financed and 
average and cream firms are offered screened contracts.  If a lender deviates from full commitment 
and does not actually screen its average and cream applicants, it gains immediately by avoiding the 
screening costs.  The cost, however, is that all bad firms will apply for the lender’s screened financial 
contract in the future because they assign a nonzero probability of the lender shirking again and their 
outside option is zero.  Screening and turning away these bad firms in the future is costly, and the 
immediate gains from deviating from full commitment will be offset by these expected losses.9 
 
3.    Equilibrium prior to Entry 
In an economy that consists of only domestic lenders, the domestic cost of screening,  , will 
determine whether a pooling or separating equilibrium exists.  Domestic lenders can always offer 
cream firms a lucrative, screened contract of size that provides expected profits of   ( )R r to 
the firm.  The cost of screening,  , reduces the firm’s expected profit since the lender will only offer 
a contract that allows it to recoup its costs and breakeven in expectation.  Although this contract 
clearly dominates any screened contract of size 1 for a cream firm, it may not dominate an unscreened 
                                                 
9 This repeated game extension is available in the online Appendix.  
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contract.  Unscreened contracts avoid the cost of screening,  , but inevitably finance some negative 
NPV projects.  When the cost of screening,  , is sufficiently high, cream firms will prefer unscreened 
contracts being offered by domestic lenders, resulting in a pooling equilibrium in which all firms 
accept the same unscreened contract.  And, when   is sufficiently low, cream firms prefer screened 
contracts, resulting in a separating equilibrium. 
To simplify the equilibrium, I will assume there is relatively small number of cream firms, 
such that lenders can never profitably pool just cream and bad firms together on an unscreened 
contract. This reduces the number of possible pooling equilibriums but does not qualitatively affect 
the subsequent results.10 This is accomplished with the following assumption:  
 ( )B
C
R r
r pR


    (A3) 
  
This assumption ensures that for any unscreened contract, the net loss per unit of investment for bad 
firms, ( )B r pR , exceeds the net gain per unit of investment for cream firms,  ( )C R r .  This will 
hold whenever there is a significantly large ratio of bad to cream firms.   
With the above assumption, the only possible pooling contract will be one that pools all firms 
onto the smaller project.  The highest expected profits that such a contract can provide to cream 
firms is   /[1 (1 ) ]BR r p .  Thus, when   , where  is defined by equation (1), the economy 
can exhibit a pooling equilibrium in which all firms prefer to accept a small unscreened contract of 
size 1.  And, when   , the larger screened contract, which provides a payout,   ( )R r , is 
preferred by cream firms, resulting in a separating equilibrium in which cream firms prefer to take 
screened contracts for the larger investment.11   
                                                 
10  Absent assumption (A3) and when λ is sufficiently large, there will exist an unscreened contract that pools firms 
onto the larger project.  But, similar to the smaller pooling contract, this larger pooling contract only exists in 
equilibrium if the cost of screening is sufficiently high that lenders cannot profitably offer a large, screened contract 
that is preferred by cream firms.  For this reason, subsequent findings are similar when the closed economy starts 
from such a pooling equilibrium; foreign entry still increases the likelihood of a separating equilibrium where credit 
access and net output both decline.  However, one difference with starting from this pooling equilibrium is that 
foreign entry has less potential to increase the net output of cream firms. 
11 Because they can successfully invest larger amounts of capital, cream firms, rather than average firms, are always 
the firms that lenders can most easily entice to take a screened contract, thus initiating a separating equilibrium.   
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 ( )
1 (1 ) B
rR r R
p
  
       
  (1) 
The range of screening costs when a separating equilibrium occurs,   , will be higher 
when the amount of capital,  , and return, R, of a cream firm’s investment is larger.  This will 
increase the attractiveness of a screened contract to cream firms.  An increase in the number of bad 
firms, B , or a reduction in their probability of success, p, will increase the cost of the pooling 
contract, also increasing the chance of a separating equilibrium.  The outcome for average and bad 
firms in a separating equilibrium will depend on whether an unscreened contract that pools just bad 
and average firms is feasible or whether it is feasible for lenders to screen average firms.  
The more intriguing equilibrium is the potential pooling equilibrium for   .  The pooling 
equilibrium always fails to achieve the first-best allocation because cream firms fail to take on larger 
projects, and bad firms are financed for negative NPV investments.  Funds diverted away from bad 
firms toward larger projects for cream firms would increase net output, and there is a potential for the 
entry of new lenders, with a different comparative advantage, to increase overall output.  The pooling 
equilibrium will exist if domestic lenders can profitably pool all borrowers, which is true when 
/[1 (1 ) ]Br p R   , and there does not exist any other contract capable of enticing cream firms 
away from the unscreened contract (i.e.,   ).  This equilibrium is described in Proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1.  In an economy with only domestic lenders, where   and  / 1 (1 ) Br p R   , there 
is an unique equilibrium in which all firms accept an unscreened financial contract of size I=1 with payoffs   
 F (Y )  R  r / 1 (1 p)B    if Y  R
0                                   otherwise




. 
 
The equilibrium contract can be interpreted as a debt contract.  Firms receive nothing in 
failure but receive a positive payoff in success, with an implicit equilibrium interest rate of 
 / 1 (1 ) Br r p r    .  This interest rate is just enough to offset lenders’ expected losses on the 
fraction (1 ) Bp   of projects that will be taken by bad firms and subsequently fail.  A proof of 
Proposition 1 is found in the Appendix.    
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In the context of opening capital markets, the pooling equilibrium appears to capture 
economic characteristics often used to motivate financial liberalization in LDCs.  There is an 
overfinancing of bad firms and underfinancing of good firms.  Moreover, the pooling equilibrium 
occurs when the cost of acquiring information is high, which is a common characteristic of emerging 
economies (Aleem [4]).  Empirical evidence also suggests a lack of information production done by 
domestic lenders in many emerging markets.12  Given this, I will now analyze the impact of allowing 
foreign lenders to enter an economy that exhibits a pooling equilibrium.  
 
4.    Equilibrium after Entry 
The equilibrium with both foreign and domestic lenders also depends on the cost of 
screening borrowers, but it now depends on both the foreign and domestic cost of screening.  
Foreign entry has no effect on the pooling equilibrium allocation of credit described in Proposition 1 
if foreign lenders’ cost of producing information is prohibitively expensive, such that  * , where   
 
*
*( ) .
1 (1 ) B
rR r R
p
  
       
  (2) 
This threshold  is similar to that of the economy with only domestic lenders, but now the threshold 
is determined by foreign lenders’ cost of funds, *r , and screening,  * , because, by assumption (A2), 
they enjoy a comparative advantage in financing cream firms. When foreign lenders’ cost of screening 
is sufficiently low, such that  * , foreign lenders induce cream firms in a domestic pooling 
equilibrium to undertake larger projects by offering them more competitive contracts for those 
projects.  They can accomplish this despite their higher cost of screening because of their lower 
marginal cost of funds and the fixed nature of screening costs.  This result is stated formally in 
Proposition 2, and the proof is provided in the Appendix. 
 
Proposition 2.  In an economy with both foreign and domestic lenders, where   and  * , foreign 
                                                 
12 For an example involving banks in India, see Banerjee, Cole, and Duflo [6].  Gormley, Johnson, and Rhee [33] also 
provide suggestive evidence that Korean bond holders did not screen their investments in 1998.   
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entry causes a switch from a pooling equilibrium to a separating equilibrium in which all cream firms accept 
large screened contracts of size  offered by foreign lenders.  If  * , only a pooling equilibrium exists.   
 
While the entry of foreign lenders and a switch from a pooling equilibrium to a separating 
equilibrium benefits cream firms with more lucrative contracts and increases their net output, average 
firms may be worse off.  If average firms are financed in a separating equilibrium, then this will either 
occur through a domestic or foreign screened contract or a foreign unscreened contract that pools 
average and bad firms. Average firms’ expected profits and net output under either contract, however, 
may be lower.  For example, if average and bad firms continue to choose a pooling contract, the 
equilibrium payoff of this contract, * ( ) / ( )A B A BR r p      , may be lower than that of the 
closed economy payoff, R – r/(1 – (1 – p)θB), since the average quality of firms being pooled declines 
and lenders must charge a higher interest rate to continue breaking even.  Moreover, it is possible that 
neither a screening nor pooling contract will be feasible.  If * *0 max{ , }R r R r      , then 
neither type of lender can profitably screen average firms, and if    * *( ) ( )B Ar pR R r , foreign 
lenders cannot profitably offer an unscreened contract.  The expected profits from average firms, 
*( )A R r  , would not be enough to offset the expected losses on bad firms, *( )B r pR  .  If both 
these conditions hold, only cream firms will be financed in the separating equilibrium.   
The overall impact of foreign entry on net output will depend on the relative gains and losses 
of cream, average, and bad firms.  For example, in a separating equilibrium in which neither average 
nor bad firms are financed, the entry of foreign lenders will entice cream firms to take on larger 
projects.  This increases their net output by  * *( ) CR r R r        , where r  is the equilibrium 
interest rate in the closed economy that exhibits a pooling equilibrium.  But, the inability of average 
and bad firms to obtain financing causes a loss in net output of  ( ) A BR r p   .  This suggests a 
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possible decline in output, which is described in Proposition 3 and proven in the Appendix.13 
 
Proposition 3. In an economy that switches from the pooling equilibrium with domestic lenders to the 
separating equilibrium with foreign lenders and no financing of average and bad firms, net output will decline 
when    * *( ) ( )A B CR r p R r R r              , where  / 1 (1 ) Br r p    .  
 
The potential drop in output can be considerable, as illustrated in the following numerical 
example:  Suppose successful projects yield a 15% return (R = 1.15) and that cream firms are able to 
implement projects four times as large (  4 ).  Cream firms represent one-fifth of the firms 
 ( 1/ 5)C , whereas the other firms are split equally between average and bad   ( 2 / 5)A B .  
Projects of bad firms only succeed with 75% probability (p = 0.75).  Domestic lenders cost of funds is 
3% (r = 1.03), whereas foreign lenders cost of funds is only 2% (r* = 1.02).  Under this setup, just a 
small difference in screening costs for the two types of lenders will generate differing comparative 
advantages and a drop in net output.  For example, if  = 0.48 and  * = 0.50 (which would imply 
breakeven lending rates on large, screened loans from domestic and foreign lenders of 15% and 
14.5%, respectively), foreign entry will cause a shift from a pooling equilibrium to a separating 
equilibrium, and net output will decline by 20%.14 
 
5.    Comparative Analysis and Implications 
The model provides a relatively simple explanation as to why entry by additional lenders may 
not necessarily increase overall output.  In markets with significant costs to producing information 
about firms’ types, lenders may choose to pool risks and cross-subsidize losses on low-return firms 
                                                 
13 When a decline in net output occurs in the open economy, the separating equilibrium allocation is always 
constrained inefficient, and the pooling equilibrium is always constrained efficient.  Because of this, it is possible to 
use a mechanism design approach to analyze potential welfare-maximizing policies for economies that experience a 
decline in net output after additional lender entry.  In particular, it is possible to show that there exists a revenue-
neutral policy that will improve net output by subsidizing the cost of capital lent for projects in the economy and 
taxing the returns on these projects. Taxing project returns can be used to implement the constrained efficient 
pooling equilibrium by providing a relative disincentive for cream firms to accept a larger screened contract. 
14 The implied equilibrium lending rates of this numerical example are on par with interest rates observed in many 
credit markets, especially emerging markets.  For example, Banerjee and Duflo [7] find that the average interest rate 
of an India bank in their sample was 16%, Mian (2006) finds that the average interest rate of domestic and foreign 
banks in Pakistan was 12.75% and 10.75%, respectively, and Giannetti and Ongena [30] estimate that the average 
interest rate of firms in their Eastern European sample was 23%. 
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with gains on high-return firms rather than invest in costly screening technologies.  Whereas new 
lenders may be even less effective at producing information, a comparative advantage in funding 
costs may allow them to offer a more competitive contract to firms capable of investing large 
amounts of capital.  Therefore, their entry can increase net output by inducing these firms to take on 
larger projects, but at the same time, net output may be declining for other firms as the financial 
contracts available to these firms will differ in a separating equilibrium. This potential for a decline in 
credit access and output is not found in existing models of competition between lenders with 
different comparative advantages in screening; these models find that entry will improve credit access 
for all firms (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez [22], Sengupta [51]).15   
At the same time, the model suggests that the inconclusive evidence pertaining to financial 
liberalization may also be the consequence of differences in the underlying fundamentals.  For 
example, net output can decline if foreign entry results in a switch from a pooling equilibrium to a 
separating equilibrium where both average and bad firms go unfinanced.  This can occur if the cost of 
obtaining information is sufficiently high for both domestic and foreign lenders, but foreign lenders’ 
cost of funds advantage is sufficient enough to facilitate cream skimming.  The parameter space 
where this occurs is described in Proposition 4 and proven in the Appendix. 
 
Proposition 4. Under the following conditions, foreign entry causes a switch from a pooling equilibrium that 
finances all firms to a separating equilibrium where only cream firms are financed and net output falls: 
(a) r > r* 
(b) * *0 ( ) ( )A BR r r pR     ,  
(c)  max , R r   , and 
(d)  * * * 1 (1 )max , ( )
1
B
A B
R p r
R r R r
    
            
, 
where   and   are defined by equations (1) and (2), respectively.  
                                                 
15 The key reason for this different outcome is their assumption that incumbent lenders have perfect information 
about borrower types, whereas entering lenders have no information. The importance of these assumptions can be 
illustrated using a modified version of the model, where, similar to Dell’Ariccia and Marquez [22], screening is always 
ineffectual for a fraction α of the bad and average firms.  Versions of Propositions 1–3 will still hold in this modified 
model, but as goes to zero and *  goes to infinity, the impact of foreign entry instead resembles that of 
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez [22] in that no firm is worse off because of segmentation.  
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Condition (a) of Proposition 4 just restates the assumption that foreign lenders enjoy a cost 
of funds advantage, which is necessary to make cream skimming possible, while condition (b) ensures 
it is unprofitable to pool average and bad firms in a separating equilibrium. Condition (c) ensures the 
domestic cost of screening is high enough that the closed economy exhibits a pooling equilibrium 
(  ) and that domestic lenders find it unprofitable to screen average firms in a separating 
equilibrium ( R r   ). Finally, condition (d) ensures that the foreign cost of screening is low enough 
to break the pooling equilibrium ( *  ) but high enough that foreign lenders cannot profitably 
screen average firms in a separating equilibrium ( * R r   ) and net output declines 
(  *( ) ( 1 (1 ) ) / (1 )B A BR r R p r            ).  To characterize the set of parameters for 
which entry breaks the pooling equilibrium, average firms are shut out of the financial market, but net 
output does not decline, one simply drops the second lower bound in condition (d).16  
The conditions necessary for a decline in net output highlight the importance of information 
acquisition costs in the local economy.  If domestic lenders’ cost of producing information,  , is not 
too high, then average firms will be screened and financed in a separating equilibrium, thus reducing 
the likelihood of entry reducing aggregate net output. This suggests that industries in which it is easier 
for lenders to assess a borrower’s potential (i.e., low  ), are more likely to experience an increase in 
net output after additional lender entry.  This might include mature industries, industries that rely less 
heavily on intangible assets, and industries with less uncertain growth prospects.  Low screening costs 
might also be driven by country-level factors.  In countries with transparent accounting rules or 
strong auditing enforcement standards, the cost of screening is likely less because lenders can rely 
more on the information contained in firm’s financial statements and avoid engaging in the costly 
collection of additional information through other channels.  
The importance of information acquisition costs for foreign lenders is more nuanced.  Again, 
a sufficiently high screening cost, * , is necessary to ensure it is not feasible for average firms to be 
                                                 
16 Interestingly, the second part of Assumption (A1), that foreign lenders have a higher cost of screening, ĸ* > ĸ, is 
not necessary for a decline in net output.  There exist parameter spaces for ĸ* < ĸ where foreign entry and market 
segmentation cause a decline in net output; examples of this are discussed later.  
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screened by foreign lenders in a separating equilibrium and for net output to decline.  However, as 
shown in condition (d) of Proposition 4, it must also be the case that foreign lenders’ cost of 
screening is not so high that it offsets their cost of funds advantage and prohibits their ability to break 
the pooling equilibrium by offering more competitive contracts to cream firms.   If *  and the 
closed economy exhibits a pooling equilibrium, then foreign entry will not break the pooling 
equilibrium and net output increases because of foreign lenders’ lower cost of funds. 
For a given set of parameters *, , , , , ,A B r r p    and R where conditions (a) and (b) of 
Proposition 4 hold, one can use the conditions (c) and (d) of Proposition 4 to map out the possible 
equilibria for every possible combination of screening costs, ĸ and ĸ*.  An example of this is provided 
in Figure 1, where possible equilibria are described for ĸ and ĸ* such that foreign lenders are 
disadvantaged in screening (i.e., ĸ* > ĸ), but can offer more competitive contracts to cream firms.17  
As shown in Figure 1, when   , the equilibrium will be a separating equilibrium in the closed 
economy, but for   , the closed economy exhibits a pooling equilibrium. Whether foreign entry 
causes a switch to a separating equilibrium and a decline in net output for   depends on ĸ*.  For  
*     , where *( ) ( (1 (1 ) ) ) / (1 )B A BR r R p r            , entry causes a switch from 
the pooling equilibrium to a separating equilibrium where only cream firms obtain financing and net 
output declines.18  When * *R r    , cream firms remain the only firms financed in the 
separating equilibrium, but net output increases.  For * *R r   , both average and cream firms are 
financed in the separating equilibrium and net output rises. 
Figure 2 provides a numerical example of Figure 1 under the following assumptions: 
successful projects yield a 15% return (R = 1.15); bad firms only succeed with 80% probability (p = 
0.8) and represent one-fifth of the firms with the remaining firms being split evenly between average 
and cream (θB = 1/5, θA = 2/5); cream firms are able to implement projects two and a half times as 
                                                 
17 For illustrative purposes, Figure 1 assumes that R – r and R – r* are not the binding lower bounds in conditions (c) 
and (d) of Proposition 4.  It can be shown, however, that these will never be the binding constraints when domestic 
lenders have a competitive advantage in screening the smaller project, such that ĸ* + r* > ĸ + r.   
18 While Figure 1 only describes regions where foreign lenders have a higher cost of funds, ĸ* > ĸ, net output also 
declines for *      even when ĸ* < ĸ. 
21 
 
large (λ = 2.5); and domestic lenders’ cost of funds is 9% (r = 1.09), whereas foreign lenders’ cost of 
funds is 7.5% (r* = 1.075).19  Under these assumptions, the possible equilibria resemble that of Figure 
1, and Figure 2 graphs the possible equilibria in the range of screening costs ĸ and ĸ* that capture the 
switch in equilibrium.  As shown in Figure 2, a pooling equilibrium will occur in the closed economy 
when ĸ is greater than about 0.135.  For example, ĸ = 0.1375 would yield a pooling equilibrium in the 
closed economy with an equilibrium unscreened interest rate of 13.5% and breakeven lending rates 
on the two (non-equilibrium) screened loans of size 1 and 2.5 equal to 23% and 14.5% respectively.  
A foreign lender with a higher cost of screening, but one that is below about 0.16, however, could 
break this equilibrium.  For example, a foreign lender with a cost of screening equal to 0.155 would 
enter the economy and offered screened contracts of size 2.5   to cream firms with an interest rate 
of about 13.75%.  This entry would break the pooling equilibrium, causing average firms to be shut 
out from financing, and leading to a reduction in net output of about 7%. 
Total net output can also decline even when average firms are not shut out of the credit 
market following foreign entry.  For example, if the pooling contract remains feasible in the 
separating equilibrium, such that * *( ) ( ) 0A BR r r pR     , both average and bad firms may 
continue to be financed, but on worse terms than in the closed economy.  The equilibrium lending 
rate on the contract that pools bad and average firms will be * * (1 ) / (1 (1 ) )C C Br r p       , 
whereas the equilibrium lending rate in the closed economy was / (1 (1 ) )Br r p    .  The 
equilibrium lending rate for the pooling contract can rise in the open economy because cream 
skimming by other lenders increases the ratio of firms accepting the pooling contract that will fail.  
This increase in borrowing costs can reduce the net output of average and bad firms, and this decline 
in their net output can exceed the increase in net output from cream firms taking on larger projects. 
The parameter space where this occurs is described in Proposition 5 and proven in the Appendix. 
                                                 
19 I choose a different set of parameters here than in Section 4 to demonstrate robustness of the model to choosing a 
higher cost of funds and making screening costs a lower share of lenders’ total cost.  
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Proposition 5. Under the following conditions, foreign entry causes a switch from a pooling equilibrium that 
finances all firms to a separating equilibrium where cream firms are screened and financed for large projects, 
average and bad firms continue to accept the pooling contract of size 1, and net output falls: 
(a) r > r* 
(b) * *( ) ( ) 0A BR r r pR     ,  
(c)  *max , ( ) / ( )A B A Br p r         , and 
(d)  * * * *max (1 ) / ( ), ( 1)( ) ( ) / (1 )B A B A Br p p R r r r                 , 
where   and   are defined by equations (1) and (2), respectively. 
 
Condition (a) is the same as in Proposition 4, while condition (b) is reversed to ensure it is 
feasible to pool average and bad firms. Condition (c) ensures the domestic cost of screening is high 
enough that the closed economy exhibits a pooling equilibrium (  ) and average firms find the 
pooling contract in the open economy more attractive than a domestic screened contract 
( * ( ) / ( )A B A Br p r        ). Finally, condition (d) ensures that the foreign screening cost is low 
enough to break the pooling equilibrium ( *  ) but high enough that average firms prefer the open 
economy pooling contract ( * * (1 ) / ( )B A Br p p      ) over that of a screened contract and net 
output declines ( * * *( 1)( ) ( ) / (1 )A BR r r r          ).   
While net output can decline even when average firms are financed in the separating 
equilibrium, the range of *  where this occurs is smaller than in the scenario where both average and 
bad firms are shut out entirely.  The threshold level of *  above which net output declines in 
Proposition 5 is greater than the threshold when average firms are shut out entirely in Proposition 4.  
The intuition is straightforward; the net output of cream firms in the open economy,  
* *[ ( ) ]C R r    , is decreasing in the screening cost, * , and remains the same in both scenarios, 
but the decline in net output for bad and average firms is greater when they lose financing entirely.20 
                                                 
20 The likelihood of a decline in net output in this setting is even greater when foreign lenders’ supply of capital is 
limited such they are only able screen and finance a fraction α of the cream firms.  In this setting, it can be shown 
that there exists an open economy equilibrium where αθC  cream firms are screened and financed by the foreign 
lenders, all other firms continue to be pooled by domestic lenders, and net output declines when ĸ *> (λ – 1)(R – r*) 
+ (r – r*) . The range of ĸ* where net output declines is greater in this constrained setting since average and bad firms 
no longer benefit from foreign lenders’ lower cost of funds and fewer cream firms increase their net output.     
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Similar to before, it is easy to see that the parameter space described in Proposition 5 is non-
empty.  For example, foreign entry will cause a shift from the pooling equilibrium to a separating 
equilibrium where average and bad firms continue to be pooled but net output declines by about 4 
percent under the following set of assumptions: successful projects yield a 16% return (R = 1.16); bad 
firms only succeed with 80% probability (p = 0.8) and represent one-fifth of the firms with the 
remaining firms being split evenly between average and cream (θB = 1/5, θA = 2/5); cream firms are 
able to implement projects three times as large (λ = 3); and domestic lenders’ cost of funds is 9% (r = 
1.09), whereas foreign lenders cost of funds is 7.5% (r* = 1.075).21 
 
6.    Robustness and Extensions 
 This section discusses the robustness of the model’s main implications.  First, I extend the 
model by allowing lenders to invest in greater screening expertise, and second, I extend the model by 
allowing foreign lenders to improve their screening capacity via acquisitions. While providing further 
insights on how entry affects lenders’ incentive to invest in information production, neither extension 
affects the main findings.  Third, I will show that the findings are robust to more general assumptions 
regarding the distribution of firms, project sizes, and expected returns. 
 
6.1 Investments in Screening Expertise 
 To analyze how foreign entry might affect lenders’ incentives to invest in screening capacity, I 
now extend the model to allow for such investments.  Specifically, I assume that a domestic lender’s 
screening cost is given by   e  0 , where   is the baseline screening cost, and e is the lender’s 
expertise in screening. Likewise a foreign lender’s cost of screening is given by * e  . While baseline 
screening costs,  and * , are still fixed, lenders can lower their per-firm screening cost by investing 
in expertise, e.  A lender’s cost of obtaining expertise e is increasing and convex in e and given by 
                                                 
21 It is also possible to show that there exists a non-empty parameter space where foreign entry causes a shift to a 
separating equilibrium where both average and cream firms accept screened contracts but net output declines.  The 
intuition is similar; net output of average firms can decline when the small, screened contract is more expensive than 
the closed economy contract that pooled all firms on the small project.  
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 c(e ), where c(0)=c’(0)=0, c’(e)>0, c’’(e)>0 for e > 0, and   equals the number of firms the lender 
expects to screen (i.e., a bank that plans to screen and acquire information about more firms will need 
to train more loan officers, etc.).  With this change, a strategy configuration in this economy now 
consists of the set of contracts jF  and choice of ej and j  for each lender j L , and the expected 
profits of lender j  lending to firm i with contract F  is now given by 
    ( | ) ( | ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )j i F p i I R r j I F j e j S          
where ( )r j  and ( )j represent the cost of funds and baseline screening cost for lender j ; I 
represents the amount of financing associated with contract F; and 0S  for unscreened contracts 
and equals one otherwise. Lender j’s total expected profits is given by 
( , )
( | ) ( )
j
j j j ji F
i F di c e     . 
 Using the same notation as in Section 2, the economy’s equilibrium is formally defined as 
 
Definition of Equilibrium:  A strategy configuration, ( )f i  for each firm i E , ej , j  , and 
 implied by jF for each lender j L , constitutes equilibrium if and only if   
(1)  given  , each firm i E  chooses ( )f i   to maximize  ( )f ; 
(2) each lender j L  chooses ej , j  ,and jF to maximize  , ( | ) ( )j j j ji F i F di c e     , 
where ( , )ji F   is given by condition 1; and 
(3) because of free entry, each lender makes zero profits, 
( , )
( | ) ( ) 0
j
j j j ji F
i F di c e      . 
To preserve the comparative advantage of domestic lenders in screening and to simplify the 
analysis, I will continue to assume that foreign lenders’ baseline cost of screening,   *, is higher than 
that of domestic lenders but that both lenders have access to the same cost structure for investments 
in screening expertise. All other assumptions of the model remain the same. 
 In this extended model, each lender now makes two choices.  First, a lender must decide 
whether they will invest in screening some firms by offering screened contracts.  Second, if they offer 
screened contracts, then they must decide what level of screening expertise to invest in.   
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In equilibrium, it will turn out that if lenders find it worthwhile to invest in the screening 
firms, then competition among lenders will induce them to invest in expertise, e, up to the point, e , 
which is the level of expertise where the reduction in the screening cost from an additional 
investment in expertise is equal to the marginal cost of that investment.  A lender that offers screened 
contracts but only invests in expertise e < e  can always be undercut by a lender that invests e .  
 While providing insights on how foreign entry might affect lenders’ incentive to invest in 
screening capacity, this extension does not qualitatively change the possible equilibria.   Similar to 
before, a pooling equilibrium will occur in the closed economy if domestic lenders’ baseline cost,   , 
is sufficiently high, and foreign entry can cause a separating equilibrium that reduces net output when 
  * falls within a certain range.  For example, we have the following proposition, which is proven in 
the Appendix: 
 
Proposition 6. With foreign entry and the ability to invest in screening expertise e at cost c(e), a switch from 
a pooling equilibrium that finances all firms to a separating equilibrium where only cream firms are financed 
and net output falls will occur when: 
(a) r > r* 
(b) * *0 ( ) ( )A BR r r pR     ,  
(c)   max   e  c( e ),R  r  e  c( e )   , and 
(d)  * * * 1 (1 )( ( )) max , ( ) .
1
B
A B
R p r
e c e R r R r
    
              
 
 where e  is given by  c '( e )  1 and   and   are defined in equations (1) and (2). 
 
Comparing Propositions (4) and (6), we see that the ability to invest in screening expertise 
increases the  necessary to cause a pooling equilibrium in the closed economy and shifts upward the 
range of *  necessary to cause a separating equilibrium where net output falls.  For 
( )e c e       , a pooling equilibrium in the closed economy will no longer be sustainable since 
lenders can invest in screening expertise and improve the attractiveness of their screened contracts, 
but for ( )e c e    , the pooling equilibrium persists.  Similar dynamics play out when foreign 
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entry occurs, leading to an upward shift in the range of  * that cause a shift to the separating 
equilibrium and decline in net output.   
 While the potential decline in net output remains, the extended model highlights how foreign 
entry can induce greater investment in screening capacity by domestic lenders.   In the separating 
equilibrium, domestic lenders may invest in screening expertise so as to retain a competitive 
advantage among average firms, and maintaining this competitive advantage will be possible when 
foreign lenders’ disadvantage in screening is sufficiently large, such that  *   r  r * .22 If the 
baseline cost of screening,   , is less than ( )R r e c e   , it will be feasible for domestic lenders to 
invest in screening capacity e  and offer screened contracts to average firms following foreign entry. 
 Foreign lenders’ lower cost of funds, however, might help them offset domestic lenders’ 
investments in screening expertise.  For example, if investing in screening capacity requires lenders to 
borrow funds up front, then foreign lenders’ lower cost of funds can provide them an advantage in 
the race to expand screening expertise.  Specifically, if the cost of investment e in screening expertise 
is instead given by ( )r c e  for domestic lenders and * ( )r c e for foreign lenders, then foreign lenders 
will choose to invest more in screening expertise since r* < r.  Specifically, they will invest *e  where 
*e is given by * *'( ) 1/c e r , while domestic lenders, if they invest at all, will invest *e e  where e is 
given by '( ) 1/c e r .  If foreign lenders’ cost of funds advantage is sufficiently large, their 
investments in expertise may be enough to offset the screening advantage of domestic lenders. 
 
6.2 Investment in Screening Capacity via Mergers 
 Another route by which foreign lenders might attempt to improve their screening capacity is 
by acquiring a domestic lender.  If domestic lenders’ lower screening cost is driven by their loan 
                                                 
22 In this regard, one can think of these investments in screening capacity as an arms race similar to that of Glode, 
Green, and Lowery [31], though the arms race here is quite different in that one lender’s investment in information is 
not made superfluous by other lenders’ investments since each firm is screened by at most one lender.  Whether 
these investments reflect an “overinvestment” in screening capacity depends on the parameter space.  In the 
parameter space described in Proposition 6, one could view foreign lenders’ equilibrium investment in screening as 
an overinvestment since it leads to a constrained inefficient equilibrium, whereas the pooling equilibrium (without 
screening) is constrained efficient.  But if either condition (c) or (d) of Proposition 6 were violated, then the 
equilibrium investments in screening capacity would increase net output.   
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officers’ greater knowledge about local firms or the ability of these loan officers to better parse local 
firms’ financial statements, then the acquisition of an incumbent lender may allow the entering lender 
to lower its screening cost and reduce its informational disadvantage.   
To formalize this possibility and analyze the potential role of acquisitions in how lenders 
enhance their screening capacity, I now extend the base model to provide foreign lenders the choice 
on whether to acquire a domestic lender.  Specifically, I assume that if a foreign lender acquires a 
domestic lender, it is able to lower its cost of screening to  , but this comes at the cost of taking on 
some of the inherent organizational or technological disadvantages of the incumbent, such that the 
foreign lenders cost of funds rises to *r   for some 0  .23  Under this setup, it can be shown that 
the merged lender will be able to offer the most competitive screened contract of size 1 when 
* *min{ , }r r      since *     ensures that the merged lender can offer a more competitive 
screened contract than foreign lenders and *r r   ensures the merged lender can offer a more 
competitive screened contract than the domestic lender.  Furthermore, if *( ) /     , the 
merged lender will also be able to offer the most competitive screened contract of size  . The 
merged lender will never offer a pooling contract since the foreign lender can always offer the most 
competitive pooling contract because of its lower cost of funds.   
With this extension, it is easy to see that the ability to merge can reduce the parameter space 
under which a decline in net output can occur.  For example, average firms will only go unfinanced in 
a separating equilibrium when the pooling contract is infeasible and 
 * * *0 max , , ( )R r R r R r           , such that no lender—domestic, foreign, or 
merged—finds it feasible to screen average firms.  When * *min{ , }r r     , the latter condition 
pertaining to the merged lender will be the most binding constraint, which reduces the range of 
 where average firms go unfinanced.   
 The use of acquisitions to expand screening capacity, however, does not eliminate the 
                                                 
23 In practice, such a cost structure might be also accomplished through syndicated lending or if incumbent lenders 
gain access to the lower cost of capital. This might occur if foreign entry coincides with other reforms that foster 
domestic lenders’ access to international capital markets or if entry results in a transfer of technology to incumbent 
lenders, as suggested by Levine [39].   
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possibility of a decline in output.  To see this, consider the extreme example where 0  .  In this 
setting, acquisition of a domestic lender allows the foreign lender to completely capitalize on its lower 
cost of funds and the incumbent lender’s lower cost of screening. Because a merged lender can always 
offer the most competitive contracts in this special case, foreign lenders will always acquire domestic 
lenders upon entry, and only merged lenders will offer contracts in equilibrium.  Whether net output 
declines will now only depend on  .   In particular, we have the following proposition, which is 
proven in the Appendix: 
 
Proposition 7. With foreign entry that allows for acquisitions of domestic lenders and 0   , a switch from 
a pooling equilibrium that finances all firms to a separating equilibrium where only cream firms are financed 
and net output falls will occur when: 
(a) r > r* 
(b) * *0 ( ) ( )A BR r r pR     ,  
(c)  * * 1 (1 )max , , ( )
1
B
A B
R p r
R r R r
     
            
 
where   and   are defined in equations (1) and (2). 
 
Comparing Propositions 4 and 7, we see that the range of   where net output declines is 
reduced.  It can also be shown that the range of   implied by condition (c) of Proposition 7 is 
nonempty.  For example, in the numerical example from Section 4, there would still be a drop in net 
output for (0.495, 0.5034)  .   Given the parameters from the first numerical example in Section 5, 
however, there is no longer a screening cost,  , that can satisfy condition (c) of Proposition 7.24  
The potential merger of lender attributes also yields dynamic implications. While the above 
model is static (such that lenders merge at time of entry), one could easily imagine that such a process 
might only occur slowly over time.  For example, the entering lenders’ cost of screening,  *, might 
                                                 
24 Interestingly, if lenders’ screening costs, ĸ and ĸ*, occur on a per firm basis rather than a per project basis, then firms 
will also have an incentive to merge. So long as lenders’ screening costs do not scale up one-to-one with the amount 
of capital, I, that can be successfully invested, firms will have an incentive to merge so as to obtain more lucrative 
screened financial contracts. To prevent such mergers from occurring until only one large firm remains, one would 
need to extend to model to include an organizational cost of running such conglomerates. In such an extension, 
firms would only merge up to the point where the marginal benefit of further mergers, via lower borrowing costs, 
equals the marginal cost, via greater organizational costs.  By changing the set of equilibrium contracts, foreign entry 
may increase the marginal benefits of such mergers and thus increase the creation of conglomerates after entry. 
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start high but decline with time (either through mergers or through the accumulation of local 
knowledge).  In such a case, one might start off in parameter space where foreign lenders are limited 
to cream skimming and net output falls (similar to Proposition 4) and eventually end up in a 
parameter space where foreign lenders target a larger subset of firms and net output increases.     
 
6.3    Distribution of Firms and Project Sizes 
The basic mechanisms of the model are also robust to allowing for a richer distribution of 
firms with varying project sizes,  , and returns, R .  In such a model, the screening cost thresholds, 
 and  , would simply become firm specific.  For instance, a cream firm, i , with a project of size 
( )i and return ( )R i , such that  ( )i , would be screened and financed fully in the economy 
without foreign lenders.  And, all cream firms with smaller projects or returns, such that  ( )i , 
will be pooled with average and bad firms.  Again, foreign entry has the potential to unravel the 
pooling equilibrium as foreign lenders’ lower cost of funds might allow them to target a larger set of 
cream firms and reduce the number of firms pooled by domestic lenders. 
Allowing for different returns across project sizes also does not affect which firms foreign 
lenders will target in the open economy. Foreign lenders’ lower cost of funds provides them a 
competitive advantage per dollar invested, and this competitive advantage does not depend on 
expected returns.  Specifically, the highest payoff a foreign lender can offer on screened contracts of 
size I  is (R  r * )I  *, while the highest payoff a domestic lender can offer is (R  r )I  .  
Therefore, foreign lenders will have a competitive advantage in offering screened contracts to any 
firms with a project of size * *( ) / ( )I r r    .25 
 
7.   Empirical Evidence 
This section discusses the empirical evidence underlying the model’s key assumptions about 
the comparative advantages of foreign and domestic lenders.  The section also discusses the model’s 
                                                 
25 Maintaining the higher average return of cream firms on the larger project, but allowing for the possibility that 
average firms produce an even higher return with some probability also does not affect the equilibrium.  So long as 
the expected return of average firms on the large project is lower than the cost of funds, no lender will offer large, 
screened contracts to average firms. 
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testable predictions and how they relate to the existing empirical evidence regarding foreign lender 
entry into LDCs and subsequent changes in local credit and net output.   
 
7.1    Empirical Support for Assumptions 
 The key assumption of the model is that foreign lender entry coincides with the arrival of a 
new lending cost structure that has the potential to break a domestic pooling equilibrium.  In the 
model, this is accomplished through the entry of a foreign lender that is assumed to have a higher 
cost of screening but a lower marginal cost of funds than the incumbent lenders.  
 The assumption that screening costs are higher for foreign lenders is widely supported by 
existing empirical evidence.  A greater distance between lender and borrower—where distance is 
broadly defined to include hierarchical, geographical, and cultural distance—can increase a lenders’ 
cost of acquiring information and is a key feature of foreign lending (Berger, Klapper, and Udell [11]).  
For example, Stein [52] demonstrates that the greater hierarchical structure of foreign lenders can 
make it more costly for them to use the “soft information” necessary to screen firms, and Petersen 
and Rajan [47] note that the cost of acquiring information about borrowers likely increases with the 
geographical distance between the lender and borrower.  Consistent with informational costs 
associated with distance being particularly salient for foreign lenders, Mian [43] finds evidence that 
distance barriers for foreign banks operating in Pakistan are sufficiently large to exclude them from 
certain sectors of the economy entirely, and Buch [15] finds a negative correlation between distance 
and the international banking activities of banks located in France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, 
and the United States.  Recent work on lending relationships and loan prices in Belgium, Italy, and 
the United States also suggest that greater lending distances are associated with increased 
transportation and informational costs for lenders (Agarwal and Hauswald [2], Degryse and 
Ongena[21], Mistrulli and Casolaro [45]).  
The second assumption that foreign lenders enjoy a lower cost of funds is also supported by 
existing evidence. Within-country comparisons suggest that foreign banks have, on average, lower 
interest expenses, overhead costs, and total employment per unit of assets relative to their domestic 
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counterparts, particularly in LDCs (Mian [42], Micco, Panizza, and Yañez [44]).  There are a variety of 
reasons why foreign banks may enjoy a cost of funds advantage.  Foreign lenders are often less 
beholden to local laws and labor unions than domestic lenders, making it less costly for them to 
expand operations and raise additional funds in the domestic economy.26  Foreign banks might also 
enjoy a comparative advantage in raising capital.  Foreign banks may be able to raise capital locally at 
a lower cost because investors in LDCs perceive foreign banks as safer because they are backed by a 
large, foreign affiliate (Mian [42]) and less likely to make political loans (Micco, Panizza, and Yañez 
[44]). Well-developed securities markets and better institutions in the home countries of foreign 
lenders may also provide them access to cheaper sources of capital.   
 
7.2    Testable Implications and Evidence 
 The model generates a number of testable predictions regarding the impact of foreign entry. 
(P1) Foreign entry can induce a segmented credit market where foreign lenders only target 
the largest, most profitable, and least-informationally opaque firms (see Proposition 4). 
(P2) Foreign entry will coincide with a decline in credit from domestic lenders and a 
potential decline in overall credit and net output (see Propositions 4 and 5). 
(P3) A decline in net output is less likely to occur when  screening costs in the closed 
economy are low (see Propositions 4 and 5). In practice, many factors, like strong 
country-level institutions (e.g., countries with transparent accounting rules and strong 
auditing enforcement standards), might reduce the screening cost of local lenders.   
(P4) Conditional on a switch from a pooling to separating equilibrium where foreign 
lenders cream skim, a broad curtailment of lending by domestic lenders (and a decline in 
net output) is less likely to occur when any of the following conditions hold: 
a. the domestic cost of screening is lower (see Proposition 4c); for example, in 
countries with strong institutions or in industries with easier to value assets,  
                                                 
26 For example, by sidestepping local unions in India, foreign banks are able to hire fewer workers and pay a lower 
average wage bill per deposit collected relative to domestic banks (Hanson [35]).  This provides them a competitive 
advantage in establishing additional branches from which they can raise new deposits.  
32 
 
b. ratio of bad to average firms is lower (see Proposition 4b); for example, in older, 
more established industries in which the number of likely failures is lower, and 
(P5) To improve their ability to produce information and obtain a competitive advantage, 
foreign lenders may prefer to merge with domestic lenders, and a decline in net output is 
less likely to occur when such mergers occur (see Section 6.2). 
Many of these predictions map closely to the broad, existing empirical evidence regarding the 
effects of financial liberalization on growth and output, whereas other predictions have yet to be 
formally studied.  The remainder of this paper discusses this evidence and proposes areas that are 
promising directions for future empirical research on financial liberalization.    
 
7.2.1   Evidence on Segmentation and Acquisitions 
There is broad empirical support for the model’s prediction that foreign lenders cream skim 
the least informationally opaque, largest, and most profitable firms (Prediction P1).  Mian [43] finds 
that foreign banks in Pakistan tend to avoid loans that are typically associated with acquiring soft 
information, such as loans to small firms and first-time borrowers, whereas Gormley [32] finds that 
foreign banks in India only lent to a small subset of the largest, most profitable firms. In particular, 
only the top 10% of firms, in terms of profitability, appear to experience an increase in bank loans 
following foreign lender entry in India.  Other papers find that foreign banks are less likely to lend to 
small, informationally opaque firms in Latin America (Berger, Klapper and Udell [11], Clarke, Cull, 
Peria, and Sánchez [19]), that small firms in Eastern Europe appear to benefit less from foreign entry 
(Giannetti and Ongena [30]), and that foreign lenders shy away from lower-quality firms with past 
delinquencies (Berger, Klapper, and Udell [11]).  
There is also evidence to support the prediction that, by lowering foreign lenders’ cost of 
screening, acquisitions of domestic lenders will be a preferred mode of entry and allow foreign banks 
to target a larger share of the lending market (Prediction P5).  Anecdotally, countries that allow 
foreign banks to acquire domestic banks tend to experience a subsequent wave of acquisitions.  For 
example, Mexico first allowed foreign banks to purchase controlling stakes in its largest banks in 
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1997, and the foreign ownership of banking assets quickly increased from 16% in 1997 to 82% in 
2004 (Haber and Musacchio [34]).  A more limited type of entry tends to occur when countries 
prohibit such acquisitions.  For example, when India allowed the entry of new foreign banks in 1994, 
entry was largely limited to green field investments, and as of 2009, foreign banks only owned about 
5% of the banking assets in India (Gormley [32]).27  And consistent with acquisitions lowering the 
cost of screening and allowing foreign lenders to target more firms, Degryse, Havrylchyk, Jurzyk, and 
Kozak [20] find that foreign banks that enter via acquisition finance more informationally-opaque 
firms relative to foreign banks that enter via greenfield investments. 
 
7.2.2   Evidence on Heterogeneity of Foreign Entry’s Impact  
The model’s prediction regarding the potential negative impact of foreign entry on overall 
output and growth (Prediction P2) fits well in the context of the existing empirical literature.  To date, 
many studies find no clear impact of foreign lender entry on overall credit, output, and growth (e.g., 
Arteta, Eichengreen, and Wyplosz [5], Edison, Levine, Ricci, and Sløk [25], Rodrik [49]) while others 
find the impact is negative (e.g., Beck and Peria [9], Detragiache, Gupta, and Tressel [24], Gormley 
[32]).  Moreover, in country-specific studies in which foreign entry was found to reduce overall credit, 
the evidence seems to confirm the model’s prediction that this will often coincide with cream 
skimming by foreign lenders and a decline in lending by domestic banks.   Analyzing foreign lender 
entry into India following its liberalization in 1994, Gormley [32] found that the new foreign banks 
only lent to a small subset of the most profitable firms and that domestic lenders responded to their 
entry by sharply curtailing their lending to all firms, not just the most profitable firms targeted by the 
new foreign lenders.  On net, Gormley found there was a decline in overall credit in Indian districts in 
which foreign bank entry occurred relative to districts in which no entry occurred. 
Country-specific studies also provide suggestive support to the model’s prediction that 
mergers between foreign and domestic lenders will increase the probability of positive impact on 
output and credit (Prediction P5). In a study of foreign lenders’ entry in Eastern Europe, where 
                                                 
27 These types of restrictions are often put in place because domestic politicians worry about preserving financial 
stability and about allowing a majority of the country’s banking assets to be suddenly acquired by foreigners.  
34 
 
foreign acquisitions were allowed and widespread, Giannetti and Ongena [30] found a positive effect 
on growth, whereas in a study of foreign lender entry in India, where such acquisitions were 
prohibited, Gormley [32] found evidence of a decline in credit access for many firms. Using variation 
across both industries and countries, Bruno and Hauswald [14] provide even more evidence regarding 
the potential importance of acquisitions. Comparing outcomes across industries that are more- and 
less-dependent on external financing, they find that increases in foreign bank ownership driven by 
acquisitions are positively related to a relatively larger increase in economic growth in industries more 
dependent on external financing; increases in ownership driven by greenfield investments are not 
associated with changes in growth.   
 
7.2.3   Quality of Local Institutions and Impact of Liberalization 
The model’s prediction regarding the importance of local institutions (Predictions P3 and 
P4a) also has the potential to explain a number of existing empirical patterns regarding the impact of 
financial liberalization.  Capital account liberalization tends to be positively associated with 
subsequent economic growth in high-income countries, where quality of accounting and auditing 
standards is likely greater, while negatively related to growth in low-income countries, where 
accounting standards are likely weaker (e.g., see Edwards [26], Quinn [48]).  Likewise, foreign bank 
entry in low-income countries is often associated with a decline in private credit and lending by 
domestic institutions (Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta [24], Gormley [32]).  
A number of studies also find that opening capital markets and domestic financial 
liberalization is only associated with a positive impact on growth in countries with greater law and 
order traditions or better legal protections for creditors, both of which are likely positively correlated 
with stronger enforcement of accounting standards (e.g., see Arteta, Eichengreen, and Wyplosz [5], 
Galindo, Micco, and Ordoñez [29]).  There is also direct evidence regarding the potential importance 
of accounting standards.  In an analysis of equity market liberalizations, Bekaert, Harvey, and 
Lundblad [10] find a large increase in economic growth for countries with an above-average 
accounting quality, but no increase in growth for countries with below average accounting standards.   
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7.2.4   Scope for Future Empirical Research 
Whereas a number of the model’s predictions are consistent with the existing empirical 
literature, there are other predictions that have yet to be extensively studied. 
For example, if foreign lenders’ cost of obtaining information declines with time, then the 
model suggests some dynamic implications where foreign lenders target more informationally-opaque 
firms over time, which can cause further changes in net output.  There is evidence that foreign bank 
profitability is higher the longer the bank has operated in a country (Claessens and van Horen [17]), 
that cream-skimming-type behavior is less likely to occur when a foreign lender expands its existing 
operations within a country (Gormley [32]), and that foreign banks lend to more informationally-
opaque borrowers as time passes (Degryse, Havrylchyk, Jurzyk, and Kozak [20]), but, to the author’s 
knowledge, there is no direct analysis of whether the impact of foreign lender entry on overall credit, 
output, and growth changes with time after initial entry occurs.   
The model also provides a number of predictions regarding how the effect of liberalization 
may vary across industries (Predictions P4a and P4b).  For example, industries in which it is more 
difficult to screen the quality of projects or in which the likelihood of failure is greater, such as newer 
industries or industries with fewer tangible assets, might be more likely to be adversely affected by 
foreign lender entry.  With the exception of Gormley [32], who found that foreign entry in India was 
more likely to be associated with a subsequent decline in sales growth for industries with fewer 
tangible assets, there is very little existing evidence on whether financial liberalization has 
heterogeneous effects across industries.   
 
8.   Concluding Remarks 
Emerging economies are often criticized for having financial sectors that seem to over 
finance low-return projects and under finance high-return projects.  For this reason, and many others, 
it is typically argued that opening capital markets would improve credit access and overall output in 
these economies.  However, the theory developed in this paper suggests that this type of domestic 
credit allocation may occur when information asymmetries are large and domestic lenders choose to 
pool risks rather than invest in costly screening technologies.   
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If true, foreign entry may take the form of cream skimming and adversely affect overall credit 
access.  Foreign lenders’ may use their lower cost of funds to offer more competitive financial 
contracts to firms capable of profitably investing large amounts of capital.  This type of entry and the 
resulting separating equilibrium may both redirect credit toward the largest, most profitable firms in 
the economy and reduce the credit access of informationally opaque firms by changing the set of 
contracts available to them.  As a result, the overall net output may decrease after foreign entry when 
information asymmetries are sufficiently costly to overcome.  The potential decline in output provides 
new insights to the inconclusive relation between foreign lender entry and aggregate output.  
More generally, the model illustrates a possible dark side to liberalization that has been 
suggested by empirical evidence but is not well understood theoretically.   The model is also able to 
generate predictions of when a new lender’s entry will adversely affect credit access and net output.  
The impact of the lender’s entry will depend on the distribution of firms, the comparative advantages 
of competing lenders, the severity of information asymmetries, whether lenders are allowed to merge, 
and the quality of local institutions.  This yields a number of testable hypotheses on how the impact 
of lender entry may vary by industry and country.  Many of these predictions find substantial support 
in the data, whereas others provide interesting avenues for future empirical research.  The model also 
provides an explanation for why existing empirical studies on the opening of capital markets, which 
assume a uniform impact across countries and industries, fail to find consistent evidence.   
The model also extends our understanding of how competition in markets with asymmetric 
information can lead to unfavorable outcomes for many agents.  In contrast many existing models, 
where screening occurs through agents’ self-revealing choices from the menu of offered contracts, 
this paper analyzes the effects of competition in a setting where lenders are able to acquire and use 
private information about agents’ types to limit their choice from the menu of offered contracts.  The 
model also broadens the set of scenarios in which increased competition can facilitate the exit of 
seemingly more efficient lenders.  The model suggests this exit can occur even in already competitive 
markets or even when an incumbent lender does not face direct competition for borrowers for which 
it enjoys a competitive advantage in financing.  
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Appendix A. Proof about shape of equilibrium contracts 
For all financial contracts where projects are implemented, it is sufficient to consider only 
contracts with ( ) 0F RI   and (0) 0F   as long as there are many lenders offering identical contracts 
in equilibrium.  This is proven in Lemma 1. 
 
Lemma 1:  For all financial contracts of size {1, }I   and type {0, , , }k A B C  it is sufficient to 
consider only equilibrium contracts with , ( ) 0I kF RI   and , (0) 0I kF   when there are 2n  lenders 
offering contracts in equilibrium. 
For each financial contract, lenders must provide a non-negative payment in 
each state of the world when projects are implemented.  This implies some payment 
( ) 0F RI   for successful projects and (0) 0F   for failures. 
For financial contracts where 0k  , this yields an expected profit of 
, , ,( | ) ( | ) ( ) [1 ( | )] (0)I k I k I kF i k p k I F RI p k I F       for the firm and an expected 
profit of      , ,( | ) [ ( | ) ( )] ( | ) ( )I k I kj jk F p k I R r j I F k j  for the lender.  Since all 
firms accepting this contract will be of type k , the expected profits can always be 
replicated for each agent involved by using a contract where , (0) 0I kF  and 
, ( ) / ( | )I kF RI p k I . 
For financial contracts where 0k   and all borrowers accepting it in equili-
brium have the same probability of success, ( | )p i I , a similar reasoning holds.  A 
payment of ( ) / ( | )F RI p i I   in success and zero otherwise can always replicate the 
expected payment of contracts that pay a non-zero amount in failure. 
For financial contracts where 0k   and all borrowers accepting the contract 
in equilibrium do not have the same probability of success, ( | )p i I , the expected pay-
ment for all agents cannot be replicated using a contract with , (0) 0I kF  .  However, 
it can be shown that a contract with , (0) 0I kF   cannot exist in equilibrium when 
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0k   and not all borrowers accepting the contract have the same probability of 
success.  Consider the case where a lender offers a contract with ,0 ( ) 0IF RI G  and 
,0 (0) 0IF H  .  If a continuum 1 of entrepreneurs accept the contract where a 
fraction  only succeed with probability p , the expected return for this lender is 
given by        [1 (1 )]( ) (1 )p RI G p H rI and this must equal zero in 
equilibrium.  If another lender offered a contract where ,0 ( )IF RI G    and 
,0 (0) 0IF  for some       1 / ,0p p H , however, it would make profits of 
    (1 )( )RI G rI  because only firms with probability of success 1 will take this 
new contract.  And, for      (1 )( ) 0RI G rI  this contract will be profitable.  
But, since        [1 (1 )]( ) (1 ) 0p RI G p H rI  in any equilibrium, it must be 
true that  RI G rI  when 0H  . Therefore, there exists some   sufficiently small 
such that      (1 )( ) 0RI G rI .   Therefore, contracts with 0k   and 0H   
can never be an equilibrium contract.     QED  
 
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 1 
Given the setup, there are eight different types of financial contracts that domestic lenders 
could offer:   1, ,,  {0, , , }k kF F k A B C .  The proof that the equilibrium of Proposition 1 exists and is 
the unique allocation will be done in five parts.  In parts 1-3, I will show that 5 of the 8 financial 
contracts cannot be equilibrium contracts.  In part 4, I will derive the conditions under which the 
three remaining financial contracts can co-exist in equilibrium.  This will be sufficient to prove the 
allocation of Proposition 1 exists and is unique when   .  Finally, in part 5, I will prove that none 
of the non-equilibrium contracts can be used to break the equilibrium in Proposition 1. 
Part 1 – When there are 2n   lenders offering the same contracts in equilibrium, any 
financial contract ,I kF  yielding negative expected profits for the lender at 1t   cannot be an 
equilibrium contract as any individual lender could increase profits by dropping the contract.  This 
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allows me to exclude financial contracts that are ex-ante unprofitable for the lender if any firm were 
to accept the contract.  Those contracts are:  , 1, ,, ,  and A B BF F F .  Because contracts take the form 
of ( ) 0F RI  and (0) 0F , as shown in Lemma 1, and pR r , the , 1, ,,  and A B BF F F   contracts 
always yield a negative return for the lender and cannot be equilibrium contracts.    
Part 2 – Suppose that ,0F   was an equilibrium contract.  By assumption (A3) and  *pR r , 
this contract can only be profitable if cream firms accept it, and will never be profitable if both cream 
and bad firms accept it.  If 1,0F is not also an equilibrium contract, however, then all bad firms will 
also choose  ,0F since Part 1 proves that 1, ,and B BF F  cannot be equilibrium contracts.  Therefore, 
,0F   can only exist in equilibrium if 1,0F  also exists and bad firms choose it.  But if cream firms 
accept ,0F  , then it must be that   ,0 1,0( ) ( )F R F R , which implies that bad firms must also prefer 
this contract since (0) 0F .  Therefore, ,0F   can never be an equilibrium contract.   
Part 3 – In order for the 1,CF contract to be an equilibrium contract, it must be that lenders 
receive non-negative profits from offering it, such that   1, ( )CF R R r , and that cream firms do 
not prefer any other contract.  But if this contract is feasible, then another lender could always 
feasibly offer the contract     , ( ) ( )CF RI R r , and cream firms would prefer the this larger 
contract since its payout exceeds the maximum possible payout of screened contract for the smaller 
project, 1,CF .  Therefore, 1,CF  cannot be an equilibrium contract.   
Part 4 – From Parts 1-3, we know there are only three possible types of equilibrium contracts: 
1,0 1, ,,  and A CF F F  .  Therefore, lenders either offer an unscreened contract for small projects, a 
screened contract for average firms, or a large screened contract for cream borrowers.  Moreover, by 
Lemma 1, it is sufficient to consider only contracts with ( ) 0F RI and (0) 0F .   
In order for the 1,AF contract to be an equilibrium contract, such that lenders have non-
negative profits from offering it, such that   1, ( )AF R R r .  Likewise, it must be that 
     , ( ) ( )CF R R r .  Therefore, these are the maximum expected profits that these contracts 
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can provide to average and cream firms respectively.  Average or cream firms will prefer the pooling 
contract, 1,0F , if its payout, 1,0 ( )F R , exceeds the maximum payout of 1, AF  and ,CF  . Moreover, if 
cream prefer the pooling contract, 1,0F , then average firms must also prefer the pooling contract.   
If 1,0F  is an equilibrium contract, then it must be the case that bad borrowers choose it since 
there is no other contract available to bad firms.  In order for the contract to be feasible for lenders 
when all firms select it, it must be that  1,0 ( ) / 1 (1 ) BF R R r p     .  When   , the maximum 
possible payoff ,CF  does not exceed the maximum possible payoff of 1,0F , and ,CF  will not be an 
equilibrium contract.   Likewise, 1, AF  is not an equilibrium contract.  This means that 1,0F is the 
unique possible equilibrium contract when   . This contract, however, is only feasible when 
 / 1 (1 ) Br p R   .  Otherwise, lenders can never offer a non-negative payoff to firms, 1,0 ( ) 0F R , 
and also make non-negative profits.  And, competition and lenders’ zero profit condition ensures that 
 1,0 ( ) / 1 (1 ) BF R R r p     .  
Part 5 – To prove this is in fact an equilibrium financial contract, it must now be shown that 
none of the other non-equilibrium contracts can offer a potential profitable deviation for agents.   
 Consider the case where   , and all firms are pooled on the small project.  It can never be 
a profitable deviation for lenders to offer ,I BF  contracts since bad firms would still implement their 
project at a loss and the lender would now take a larger loss because it screens the bad firms.    
Similarly, it is never profitable to offer ,AF  since the contract will always lose money.  And, 1,AF  or 
1,CF cannot be profitable deviations since a lender since     ensures that neither 1,AF  or 1,CF  
can be greater than 1,0F (i.e. be preferred by average or cream firms) and be a profitable contract for 
the lender.   The ,0F   contract will also by unprofitable by assumption (A3) and the fact that bad will 
always prefer the contract if cream borrowers do.  This leaves only ,CF  .  However,    implies 
that lenders can never profitably induce cream firms to take a larger contract with screening. 
Therefore, 1,0F  is an equilibrium contract for    and    / 1 (1 ) Br p R . QED 
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Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 2    
 To differentiate contracts offered by foreign lenders, I will express their contracts as ,*
I kF .  
Using the same logic as in parts 1-3 of the proof of Proposition 1, there are only three potential 
foreign lender contracts that can be equilibrium contracts 1,0*F , 
1,
*
AF , and ,*
CF  , and it is sufficient to 
consider contracts of the form * ( ) 0F RI and * (0) 0F .  In an economy with both domestic and 
foreign lenders, the domestic lender contract, ,CF  , can no longer be an equilibrium contract for 
domestic lenders because of assumption (A2), and 1,0F cannot be an equilibrium contract since 
*r r .  Therefore, there are only four possible equilibrium contracts:  1,0*F , 1, AF , 1,* AF , and ,* CF  . 
Similar to parts 4-5 of Proposition 1, it can be shown that ,*
CF   only exists and is preferred 
by cream firms over the pooling contract 1,0*F  for  * .  Competition among foreign lenders and 
their zero profit condition will ensure that      , * ** ( ) ( )CF R R r , which exceeds the maximum 
possible payoff to cream firms with the pooling contract, 1,0*F , when  * .   QED 
 
Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 3 
 In the pooling equilibrium with domestic lenders, net output is ( )( )A B Cp R r      , where  
/ (1 (1 ) )Br r p    , while in the separating equilibrium where only cream firms accept projects 
from foreign lenders, the net output is    * *[ ( ) ]C R r .  Thus, a decrease in net output will occur 
when    * *( ) ( )A B CR r p R r R r               is true.  QED   
 
Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 4  
As shown in Proposition 1, the closed economy exhibits a pooling equilibrium when   , 
and as shown in Proposition 2, the open economy exhibits a separating equilibrium when  * .  
Moreover, as shown in the proof of Proposition 2, there are only three possible equilibrium contracts 
available to average firms in the open economy: 1,0*F , 
1, AF , and 1,*
AF .  If  1,0*F  exists, it must be 
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taken by bad firms, since it is the only contract available to them, and it is never feasible if average 
firms don’t also choose this contract in equilibrium.  Given this, 1,0*F  only exists if both bad and 
average firms take the contract, and the maximum payout that lenders can offer with such a contract 
is 1,0 ** [( )/( )]A B A BF R r p       .  The maximum payout that domestic lenders can offer for the 
screened contract is   1, AF R r , and the maximum payout the foreign lenders can offer for the 
small, screened contract is 1, * **
AF R r    .  If both  * *0 max ,R r R r       and 
*[( )/( ) 0A B A BR r p       , then none of these other contracts provide a positive payoff to 
firms, and ,*
CF  is the only equilibrium contract.   
Below is the list of assumptions and conditions given by Propositions 1-3 that ensure a switch 
from a pooling equilibrium in the closed economy to a separating equilibrium in the open economy 
where average and bad firms are not financed and net output declines: 
 * *, ;  Assumption (A1)r r     (E.1) 
 
*
* ;  Assumption (A2)r r       (E.2) 
 ( ) ;  pooling equilibrium in closed economy
1 (1 ) B
rR r R
p
  
       
  (E.3) 
 ;  pooling equilibrium in closed economy is feasible
1 (1 ) B
rR
p      (E.4) 
 
*
* *( ) ;  foreign entry causes separating equilibrium
1 (1 ) B
rR r R
p
  
       
  (E.5) 
 * *0 ( ) ( );  infeasible to pool average and bad firmsA BR r r pR       (E.6) 
  * *0 max , ;  infeasible to screen average firmsR r R r        (E.7) 
    * *( ) ( ) ;  decline in net output when switch A B CR r p R r R r                (E.8) 
   
  The above conditions, however, can be greatly simplified.  For example, equation (E.2) can 
be eliminated since it must always holds when   1  and equations (E.1), (E.3), (E.5),  and (E.7) all 
hold.  To see this, notice that equations (E.3) and (E.7) both place lower bounds on ĸ, such that 
 max , R r   , while equation (E.5) places an upper bound on ĸ*.  One can quickly show that for 
λ > 1, r > r*, these bounds ensure that equation (E.2) holds.  The first half of equation (E.1) can also 
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be eliminated since it is not actually necessary for a decline in net output; a decline in net output can 
occur even when *   so long as equations (E.3)-(E.8) all hold.  Equation (E.4) can also be 
eliminated since it always hold if equations (E.5) and (E.8) both hold.  And, plugging in for 
/ (1 (1 ) )Br r p    , equations(E.5), (E.7), and(E.8), can be combined to create bounds on ĸ*, such 
that  * * *max , ( ) ( (1 (1 ) ) ) / (1 ) .B A BR r R r R p r                We are then left with the 
four conditions listed in Proposition 4.     QED    
 
Appendix F. Proof of Proposition 5  
As shown in Proposition 1, the closed economy exhibits a pooling equilibrium when   , 
and as shown in Proposition 2, the open economy exhibits a separating equilibrium when  * .  
Moreover, as shown in the proof of Proposition 2, there are only three possible equilibrium contracts 
available to average firms in the open economy: 1,0*F , 
1, AF , and 1,*
AF .  If  1,0*F  exists, it must be 
taken by bad firms, since it is the only contract available to them, and it is never feasible if average 
firms don’t also choose this contract in equilibrium.  Given this, 1,0*F  only exists if both bad and 
average firms take the contract, and the maximum payout that lenders can offer with such a contract 
is 1,0 ** [( )/( )]A B A BF R r p       .  The maximum payout that domestic lenders can offer for the 
screened contract is   1, AF R r , and the maximum payout the foreign lenders can offer for the 
small, screened contract is 1, * **
AF R r    .  If * [( ) / ( ) 0A B A BR r p        and 
 * * *[( ) / ( )] max ,A B A BR r p R r R r              then the pooling contract is both 
feasible and preferred by average firms over a screened contract.   
In order for net output to decline in this scenario, it must be that net output in the closed 
economy, ( )( / (1 (1 ) )A B C Bp R r p        , exceeds net output in the open economy, 
* * *( )[ ( ) / ( )] [ ( ) ]A B A B A B Cp R r R r                .  This will be true when 
* * *( 1)( ) ( ) / (1 )A BR r r r          .  
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Below is the list of assumptions and conditions that ensure a switch from a pooling 
equilibrium in the closed economy to a separating equilibrium in the open economy where average 
and bad firms are pooled and net output declines: 
 * *, ;  Assumption (A1)r r     (F.1) 
 
*
* ;  Assumption (A2)r r       (F.2) 
 ( ) ;  pooling equilibrium in closed economy
1 (1 ) B
rR r R
p
  
       
  (F.3) 
 ;  pooling equilibrium in closed economy is feasible
1 (1 ) B
rR
p      (F.4) 
 
*
* *( ) ;  foreign entry causes separating equilibrium
1 (1 ) B
rR r R
p
  
       
  (F.5) 
 * *( ) ( ) 0;  feasible to pool average and bad firmsA BR r r pR       (F.6) 
  * * *[( ) / ( )] max , ;  average firms prefer poolingA B A BR r p R r R r              (F.7) 
 * * *( 1)( ) ( ) / (1 );  decline in net output when switch A BR r r r            (F.8) 
   
  The above conditions, however, can be greatly simplified.  For example, equation (F.2) can 
be eliminated since it must always holds when   1  and equations (F.1), (F.3),  (F.5),  and (F.7) all 
hold.  To see this, notice that equations (F.3) and  both place lower bounds on ĸ, such that 
 *max , ( ) / ( )A B A Br p r         , while equation (F.5) places an upper bound on ĸ*.  One 
can quickly show that for λ > 1, r > r*, these bounds ensure that equation (F.2) holds.  The first half 
of equation (F.1) can also be eliminated since it is not actually necessary for a decline in net output; a 
decline in net output can occur even when *   so long as equations (F.3)-(F.8) all hold.  Equation 
(F.4) can also be eliminated since it always hold if equations (F.5) and (F.8) both hold.  And equations 
(F.5), (F.7), and (F.8), can be combined to create bounds on ĸ*, such that 
 * * * *max (1 ) / ( ), ( 1)( ) ( ) / (1 ) .B A B A Br p p R r r r                  We are then left with 
the four conditions listed in Proposition 5.     QED    
 
Appendix G. Proof of Proposition 6 
This proof will proceed in four parts.  First, I will prove that a lender that offers a screened 
contract will always invest an amount ( )c e  in screening expertise, where   is the number of firms 
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screened by the lender in equilibrium and e  is given by '( ) 1c e  .  Second, I will prove that the 
conditions in Proposition 6 ensure the closed economy exhibits a pooling equilibrium with contract 
1,0F .  This proof will parallel that of Proposition 1.  Third, I will prove that that these conditions also 
ensure that foreign entry results in a separating equilibrium.  This proof will parallel that of 
Proposition 2.  Finally, I will prove that only cream firms are financed and net output declines in the 
separating equilibrium that occurs after foreign entry.  This proof will parallel that of Proposition 3.   
Part 1 – Using the same logic as in Proposition 1, it can be shown that there are only three 
possible types of equilibrium contracts: 1,0 1, ,,  and A CF F F  .  Therefore, if lenders offer a screened 
contract, it will only do so to a firm that succeeds with probability 1.  Moreover, by Lemma 1, it is 
sufficient to consider only contracts with ( ) 0F RI and (0) 0F .   
It can then be shown that a screened contract from a lender that invests in screening 
expertise e e , where e  is given by '( ) 1c e  , cannot be an equilibrium contract.   For example, 
consider a lender of type j that offers screened contracts but makes zero investment in screening 
expertise.  The best expected payoff, F(RI), that such a lender can offer with on a screened contract 
for firms of type i, loan size I and still breakeven is [ ( )] ( )R r j I j  . However, a lender of the same 
type j that invests ( )c e in order to obtain screening expertise (0, )e e  for   screened loans will 
always be offer a more competitive screened contract.   The total profits of such a lender that screens 
and finances  firms of type i is given by [ ( )] [ ( ) ] ( ) ( )R r j I j e F RI c e         , where ( )F RI  is 
the payment provided to firms that accept this contract, and hence, the best expected payoff such a 
lender can offer firms is ( ) [ ( )] [ ( ) ] ( )F RI R r j I j e c e     .  It can be shown that 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0F RI F RI e c e    since (0) '(0) 0, '( ) 0, ''( ) 0c c c e c e     for e > 0, and '( ) 1c e   for e e . 
Therefore, there will exist an 0   such that a lender of type j could always initiate a profitable 
deviation by investing in expertise (0, )e e and offering screened contracts that provide a payoff 
( )F RI  to   firms of type i.  Using a similar logic, it can then be shown that a screened contract 
from a lender that invests (0, )e e  cannot be an equilibrium contract since there will exist a 
profitable deviation for a lender that invests in screening expertise e .  
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Finally, it can be shown that investing ( )c e  to obtain the screening expertise e necessary to 
fund   firms, where  is greater than the actual number of firms screened and financed by the lender 
in equilibrium, cannot be an equilibrium outcome. A lender could always make a profitable deviation 
by investing a smaller amount ( )c e where  exactly matches the number of firms screened and 
financed by that lender. 
Part 2 – Part (c) of Proposition 6 ensures that the pooling contract 
 1,0 ( ) / 1 (1 ) BF R R r p      is the equilibrium contract in the closed economy.  Given lenders 
that offer screened contracts must invest in expertise e  , the maximum expected payoffs that 
domestic screened contracts 1,AF  and ,CF   can provide to firms in the closed economy are  
( ) ( )R r e c e     and ( ) ( ) ( )R r e c e     , respectively.  Cream firms will prefer the 
pooling contract, 1,0F , if its payout, 1,0 ( )F R , exceeds the maximum payout of ,CF  , and if cream 
prefer the pooling contract, then average firms must also prefer it. Following the same logic as in 
Parts 4-5 of Proposition 1, it can then be shown that when ( )e c e    , the maximum possible 
payoff ,CF  does not exceed the maximum possible payoff of 1,0F , and hence, ,CF  and 1, AF will not 
be equilibrium contracts.  This 1,0F contract is feasible when  / 1 (1 ) Br p R   , which similar to 
the proof of Proposition 4, must hold if condition (d) of Proposition 6 holds.  Following the same 
logic as in Parts 4-5 of Proposition 1, it can then be shown that 1,0F  is the only equilibrium contract 
for ( )e c e     and since part (c) of Proposition 6 ensures that ( )e c e    , it must be 
that  1,0 ( ) / 1 (1 ) BF R R r p      is the only equilibrium contract the closed economy. 
Part 3 – Using the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 2, it can be shown that condition 
(d) of Proposition 6 ensures that the open economy exhibits a separating equilibrium.  To 
differentiate contracts offered by foreign lenders, I will express their contracts as ,*
I kF .  Using the 
same logic as in parts 1-3 of the proof of Proposition 1, there are only three potential foreign lender 
47 
 
contracts that can be equilibrium contracts 1,0*F , 
1,
*
AF , and ,*
CF  , and it is sufficient to consider 
contracts of the form * ( ) 0F RI and * (0) 0F .  In an economy with both domestic and foreign 
lenders, the domestic lender contract, ,CF  , can no longer be an equilibrium contract for domestic 
lenders because of assumption (A2), and 1,0F cannot be an equilibrium contract since *r r .  
Therefore, there are only four possible equilibrium contracts:  1,0*F , 
1, AF , 1,*
AF , and ,*
CF  . 
Similar to parts 4-5 of Proposition 1, it can be shown that ,*
CF   only exists and is preferred 
by cream firms over the pooling contract 1,0*F  for 
* ( )e c e    .  Competition among foreign 
lenders and their zero profit condition will ensure that , * ** ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
CF R R r e c e        , 
which exceeds the maximum possible payoff to cream firms with the pooling contract, 1,0*F , when 
* ( )e c e    .   Part (d) of Proposition 6, however, ensures that * ( )e c e    , such that the 
open economy must exhibit a separating equilibrium where cream firms take ,*
CF   contracts.  
Part 4 – The only contract offered in a separating equilibrium with domestic and foreign 
lenders will be ,*
CF   contracts.  By conditions (c) and (d) of Proposition 6 , it must be that 
( )R r e c e      and * * ( )R r e c e     , which ensures that neither domestic or foreign 
lenders can feasibly offer screened contracts 1, AF  and 1,*
AF  to average firms in a separating 
equilibrium, and Condition (b) ensures that foreign lender cannot profitably offer  1,0*F . 
Using the same logic as in Proposition 3, one can then show that condition (d) in Proposition 
6 ensures that the separating equilibrium in the open economy results in a decline in net output. In 
the pooling equilibrium with domestic lenders, net output is( )( )A B Cp R r      , where  
/ (1 (1 ) )Br r p    , while in the separating equilibrium where only cream firms accept projects 
from foreign lenders, the net output is * *[ ( ) ( ) ( )]C R r e c e      .  Thus, a decrease in net output 
will occur when * *( )( ) [ ( ) ( ) ( )]A B C Cp R r R r e c e              is true.  But, condition (d) of 
Proposition 6 ensures that this must hold.  QED 
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Appendix H. Proof of Proposition 7 
This proof will proceed in three parts.  First, I prove that the conditions in Proposition 7 
ensure the closed economy exhibits a pooling equilibrium with contract 1,0F .  This proof parallels 
that of Proposition 1.  Second, I prove that that these conditions also ensure that entry of a merged 
lender results in a separating equilibrium.  This proof parallels that of Proposition 2.  Finally, I prove 
that only cream firms are financed and net output declines in the separating equilibrium that occurs 
after entry of merged lenders.  This proof parallels that of Proposition 3.   
Part 1 – Part (c) of Proposition 7 ensures that     , which following the same logic as 
Proposition 1 implies that the pooling contract  1,0 ( ) / 1 (1 ) BF R R r p     is the only possible 
equilibrium contract in the closed economy, and this will be an equilibrium contract so long as 
 / 1 (1 ) 0BR r p     .  And,    *( ) 1 (1 ) / 1B A BR r R p r                , as given 
by condition (c) of Proposition 7, ensures that  / 1 (1 ) 0BR r p     must be true. 
Part 2 – Since merged lenders can always offer the most competitive financial contracts 
(because they have both the lowest cost of screening and lowest cost of funds), it is only necessary to 
consider equilibria where merged lenders offer financial contracts. Using the same logic as in the 
proof of Proposition 2, it can be then shown that   , as implied by part(c) of Proposition 7, 
ensures that the open economy exhibits a separating equilibrium.   
Part 3 – Condition (b) and (c) of Proposition 7 ensure that neither a pooling contract with 
only average and bad firms or a screened contract for average firms is feasible.  Therefore, only cream 
firms will be financed in the separating equilibrium.  Using the same logic as in Proposition 3, one can 
then show that    *( ) 1 (1 ) / 1B A BR r R p r              , as implied by part (c) of 
Proposition 7, ensures that the separating equilibrium in the open economy results in a decline in net 
output.  QED 
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 Pooling equilibrium in both 
closed and open economies 
*  
  
Separating 
equilibrium in 
closed economy 
Pooling to separating equilibrium switch; 
only cream financed; net output falls  
R-r* 
Figure 1.  Example of possible equilibria for given screening costs,   and * . 
  
This figure provides an illustrative example of possible equilibria in both the open and 
closed economy for a given *, , , , , ,A B r r p    and R, where * *0 ( ) ( )A BR r r pR      , 
r > r*,  ( ) / (1 (1 ) BR r R r p        ,  * *( ) (1 (1 ) BR r R r p         , and  
*( ) ( (1 (1 ) ) ) / (1 )B A BR r R p r             . 
Pooling to separating 
equilibrium switch; only 
cream financed,                      
but net output                        
increases 
κ* > κ above this line 
For κ* below this line, 
entrant bank has 
comparative advantage 
for projects of size λ 
  
  
R-r 
First best allocation; both 
average and cream firms are 
screened and financed and 
net output increases 
λ(r-r*) 
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Pooling equilibrium in both 
closed and open economies 
Separating 
equilibrium in 
both closed and 
open economy 
Pooling to separating equilibrium switch; 
only cream financed, net output falls  
Pooling to separating equilibrium switch;             
only cream financed, but net output increases 
Figure 2.  Numerical example of possible equilibria for given screening costs,   and * . 
  
This figure maps the possible equilibria in both the open and closed economy for a range of κ 
and κ* when *0.4, 0.2, 1.09, 1.075, 2.5, 0.8,A B r r p         and R=1.15. 
  
*  
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A.1  Model with Generalized Correlation between Risk and Productivity 
 
A.1.1 Setup and Propositions 
In the basic model, there is an implicit negative correlation between firms’ productivity and the 
riskiness of their projects.  Specifically, for a project of size I and probability of success p, the variance of 
output is given by pI(I-pI).  Since, p = 1 for cream firms, this variance is zero, whereas for bad firms, 
where p<1, it is something greater than zero.  This can be interpreted as a negative correlation between 
risk and productivity.  
To show that this implicit assumption on the correlation between risk and productivity is not 
necessary for the model’s findings, it is sufficient to show that the model’s findings hold in a more 
general framework where bad firms’ projects succeed with probability of success pL and cream firms’ 
projects succeed with a higher probability of success pH > pL.  This more general setup doesn’t make any 
assumption about the correlation between risk and it includes possibility that pH = ½ and pL < ½, which 
would maximize cream firms’ variance of output and ensure it exceeds that of bad firms.  
Before proving that this change in assumptions doesn’t affect the model’s findings, it is first 
necessary to modify a couple other assumptions of the model to reflect the more general assumptions 
about probability of success.  Specifically, to maintain the assumption that cream firms’ projects have a 
positive NPV and bad firms projects have a negative NPV,  it must be assumed that pHR > r > r* > pLR.  
And to keep the same structure as the original model where lenders only want to finance average firms 
for the smaller project, I will assume that average firms succeed with probability pH for the smaller 
project and probability pL with the larger project.  Assumptions (A1) and (A2) remains the same, and 
Assumption (A3) is now given by the following condition: 
 
 
( )B H
C L
p R r
r p R
 (A3) 
With this revised setup, it is easy to see that the current version of the model in the paper is just 
a specific case, pH=1 and pL=p, of this more general model.  Moreover, it can be shown that solving this 
A-1
 
 
more general model proceeds in the exactly the same way as the proof of the more specific case studied 
in the paper, and nothing about the intuition or general structure of the paper’s propositions changes.   
The range of screening costs in the general case of the closed economy where cream firms prefer 
to take the pooled contract is now given by   , where  
     
          
(1 )
( )
1 (1 )
B H B L
H
B
R p p r
p R r
p
,  
and Proposition 1 is now given by: 
 
Proposition 1.  In an economy with only domestic lenders where   and 
    / (1 )B H B Lr p p R , there exists an unique equilibrium where all firms accept an unscreened 
financial contract of size I=1 with payoffs   
 
  

          
(1 )
  if 
( ) 1 (1 )
0                                   
B H B L
B
R p p r
Y R
F Y p
otherwise
. 
 
A formal proof of the modified Proposition 1 is provided below. 
Then, in the open economy, the general case threshold for   is given by: 
     
          
(1 ) *
( *)
1 (1 )
B H B L
H
B
R p p r
p R r
p
,  
and Proposition 2 remains exactly the same as before, and Proposition 3 only changes slightly to become 
the following: 
 
Proposition 3: In an economy that switches from the pooling equilibrium with domestic lenders to the 
separating equilibrium with foreign lenders and no financing of average and bad firms, net output will 
decline when             * *( ) [ ( ) ] ( ) ( )H A H H C L Bp R r p R r p R r r p R .  
 
The proofs of Proposition 2 and 3 follow the exact same outline as in the paper and that of the 
revised proof of Proposition 1 provided below.  For this reason, I haven’t included these proofs in the 
appendix of this response.   
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Finally, Proposition 4, would now be given by: 
 
Proposition 4. With foreign entry, a decline in net output will occur only if the following conditions hold: 
(a) r > r* 
(b) * *0 ( ) ( )A H B Lp R r r p R     ,  
(c)  max , Hp R r   , and 
(d) * * * ( ) ( )max , ( ) ( )
1
H A L B
H H H
A B
p R r r p R
p R r p R r p R r
     
            
 
where   and   are defined above. If these conditions hold, foreign entry causes a switch from a pooling 
equilibrium with all firms to a separating equilibrium where only cream firms are financed and net output falls. 
 
 
A.1.2  Proof of Proposition #1 in Generalized Model 
Given the setup described Section A.1.1, there are eight different types of financial contracts that 
domestic lenders could offer:   1, ,,  {0, , , }k kF F k A B C .  The proof that the equilibrium of Proposition 
1 exists and is the unique allocation will be done in five parts.  In parts 1-3, I will show that 5 of the 8 
financial contracts cannot be equilibrium contracts.  In part 4, I will derive the conditions under which 
the three remaining financial contracts can co-exist in equilibrium.  This will be sufficient to prove the 
allocation of the revised Proposition 1 exists and is unique when   .  Finally, in part 5, I will prove 
that none of the non-equilibrium contracts can be used to break the equilibrium in Proposition 1. 
Part 1 – When there are 2n   lenders offering the same contracts in equilibrium, any financial 
contract ,I kF  yielding negative expected profits for the lender at 1t   cannot be an equilibrium contract 
as any individual lender could increase profits by dropping the contract.  This allows me to exclude 
financial contracts that are ex-ante unprofitable for the lender if any firm were to accept the contract.  
Those contracts are:  , 1, ,, ,  and A B BF F F .  Because contracts take the form of ( ) 0F RI  and (0) 0F , 
as shown in Lemma 1, and Lp R r , the , 1, ,,  and A B BF F F   contracts always yield a negative return for 
the lender and cannot be equilibrium contracts. 
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Part 2 – Suppose that ,0F   was an equilibrium contract.  By assumption (A3) and  *Lp R r , this 
contract can only be profitable if cream firms accept it, and will never be profitable if both cream and 
bad firms accept it.  If 1,0F is not also an equilibrium contract, however, then all bad firms will also 
choose  ,0F since Part 1 proves that 1, ,and B BF F  cannot be equilibrium contracts.  Therefore, ,0F   
can only exist in equilibrium if 1,0F  also exists and bad firms choose it.  But if cream firms accept ,0F  , 
then it must be that   ,0 1,0( ) ( )F R F R , which implies that bad firms must also prefer this contract since 
(0) 0F .  Therefore, ,0F   can never be an equilibrium contract. 
Part 3 – In order for the 1,CF contract to be an equilibrium contract, it must be that lenders 
receive non-negative profits from offering it, such that   1, ( )C HF R p R r , and that cream firms do 
not prefer any other contract.  But if this contract is feasible, then another lender could always feasibly 
offer the contract     , ( ) ( )C HF RI p R r , and cream firms would prefer the this larger contract 
since its payout exceeds the maximum possible payout of screened contract for the smaller project, 1,CF .  
Therefore, 1,CF  cannot be an equilibrium contract.   
Part 4 – From Parts 1-3, we know there are only three possible types of equilibrium contracts: 
1,0 1, ,,  and A CF F F  .  Therefore, lenders either offer an unscreened contract for small projects, a screened 
contract for average firms, or a large screened contract for cream borrowers.  Moreover, by Lemma 1, it 
is sufficient to consider only contracts with ( ) 0F RI and (0) 0F .   
In order for the 1,AF contract to be an equilibrium contract, such that lenders have non-negative 
profits from offering it, such that   1, ( )A HF R p R r .  Likewise, it must be that 
     , ( ) ( )C HF R p R r .  Therefore, these are the maximum expected profits that these contracts 
can provide to average and cream firms respectively.  Average or cream firms will prefer the pooling 
contract, 1,0F , if its payout, 1,0 ( )F R , exceeds the maximum payout of 1, AF  and ,CF  . Moreover, if 
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cream prefer the pooling contract, 1,0F , then average firms must also prefer the pooling contract.   
If 1,0F  is an equilibrium contract, then it must be the case that bad borrowers choose it since 
there is no other contract available to bad firms.  In order for the contract to be feasible for lenders 
when all firms select it, it must be that            1,0 ( ) (1 ) / 1 (1 )B H B L BF R R p p r p .  When 
  , the maximum possible payoff ,CF  does not exceed the maximum possible payoff of 1,0F , and 
,CF  will not be an equilibrium contract.   Likewise, 1, AF  is not an equilibrium contract.  This means 
that 1,0F is the unique possible equilibrium contract when   . This contract, however, is only feasible 
when     / (1 )B H B Lr p p R .  Otherwise, lenders can never offer a non-negative payoff to firms, 
1,0 ( ) 0F R , and also make non-negative profits.  And, competition and lenders’ zero profit condition 
ensures that            1,0 ( ) (1 ) / 1 (1 )B H B L BF R R p p r p . 
Part 5 – To prove this is in fact an equilibrium financial contract, it must now be shown that 
none of the other non-equilibrium contracts can offer a potential profitable deviation for agents.   
 Consider the case where   , and all firms are pooled on the small project.  It can never be a 
profitable deviation for lenders to offer ,I BF  contracts since bad firms would still implement their 
project at a loss and the lender would now take a larger loss because it screens the bad firms.  Similarly, it 
is never profitable to offer ,AF  since the contract will always lose money.  And, 1,AF  or 1,CF cannot be 
profitable deviations since a lender since     ensures that neither 1,AF  or 1,CF  can be greater than 
1,0F (i.e. be preferred by average or cream firms) and be a profitable contract for the lender.   The ,0F   
contract will also by unprofitable by assumption (A3) and the fact that bad will always prefer the contract 
if cream borrowers do.  This leaves only ,CF  .  However,    implies that lenders can never profitably 
induce cream firms to take a larger contract with screening. Therefore, 1,0F  is an equilibrium contract 
for    and     / (1 )B H B Lr p p R . QED 
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A.2  Model without Full Commitment  
 
A.2.1 General Setup of Model without Full Commitment  
In the basic model, I implicitly make the assumption that each lender, j, can perfectly commit to 
screen projects and fully commit the initial terms of any contract, F , and initial menu of contracts, jF .  
This full commitment assumption was important in two key ways.  First, it eliminated the possibility that 
lenders would renege on their commitment to screen.  In a more general model, lenders will have an 
incentive to do this since firms never misrepresent their type in equilibrium.  Second, after lenders invest 
in the screening technology, their optimization problem changes since the cost of screening is sunk, and 
the firms’ type is now known.  Because of this, a lender’s initial contract may no longer be optimal in a 
more general model, and the threat to refuse financing a firm caught misrepresenting its type may not be 
credible.  For example, financing an average firm caught misrepresenting its type might allow a foreign 
lender to recoup some of its initial loss, and renegotiation of the initial contract could benefit both the 
lender and firm ex-post.  If this were true, average firms should know foreign lenders’ ex-ante threat to 
provide zero financing is not credible.   
To address these concerns, I now generalize the model and extend it to a repeated game 
framework where I do not make any assumptions regarding lenders’ ability to commit.  It will then be 
shown that a full commitment strategy by lenders can be derived as an optimal equilibrium strategy 
without affecting any of the main findings of the more basic model.  This is accomplished by assuming 
firms can observe whether lenders have either renegotiated their financial contracts in the past or shirked 
on their commitment to screen contracts.  With this assumption, it can be costly for lenders that 
renegotiate their contracts in that it may attract applicants in the future that are ex-ante unprofitable for 
the lender to do business with.  Since these unwanted applicants will increase lenders’ future costs, it will 
be optimal for lenders to preserve their reputation by never renegotiating or altering their financial 
contracts even after information about firms’ types is revealed.   The same type of argument holds for 
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lenders that may wish to save money today by not screening their contracts.  The future costs of having 
to screen unwanted applicants that apply on the hope the lender will again fail to screen all their 
contracts will exceed the benefits of shirking on their commitment to screen today.  Therefore, the 
repeated game equilibrium without full commitment will resemble a non-repeated equilibrium where full 
commitment is assumed.    
I will also generalize the model to allow firms that receive financing to choose whether they wish 
to implement the project or not after obtaining financing.  This is formally done by allowing firms that 
receive financing from a lender to choose action {0,1}q , where 1q   indicates the project is 
undertaken and 0q   indicates the project is not undertaken.  The action q  is observable to lenders.  
This generalization introduces an additional wrinkle into the problem in that lenders will have an 
incentive to offer a financial contract that actually pays firms to not implement the project as a way to 
induce bad firms to reveal themselves without having to invest in the costly screening technology.    
In reality, however, lenders will not have an incentive to offer contracts that pay bad borrowers 
to not implement the project since this will induce all firms without projects to seek the same payoff.  
This will be formally captured in the model by introducing a fourth type of firm, i Z , that has no 
project to implement and 0q   is their only possible action.  Additionally, there will be a continuum Z  
of these firms, where  
 
*
*
( )
( )
B
Z
r pR
p R r
    (A4) 
Assumption (A4) ensures that the mass of firms without projects, Z , is sufficiently large to rule out 
financial contracts that pay a positive amount to bad firms that abandon their low-return projects. 
The remaining assumptions regarding agents remain the same as before.  The timing of the 
model is also similar, except that the game is now repeated and allows for renegotiation of contracts after 
firms’ types becomes known through screening.  Within in each time-period t , there is now a stage 
game broken in six sub-periods, s , where at: 
A-7
 
 
0s  : firms discover their type, i  
1s  : lenders choose their menu of financial contracts ;F  firms apply for contracts 
2s  : lenders screen the applicants using screening technology, S  
3s  : lenders choose whether to renegotiate new contract, Fˆ , or provide financing, I  
4s  : firms receiving capital make investment decision, q  
5s  : project outcomes are realized, financial contracts are settled 
There is no discounting between sub-periods, but there is discounting between time-periods.   
Lenders will be long-lived in that they expect to play the game for an infinite amount of periods in the 
future, while firms are short-lived and only play for one period.  At the start of each period, ,t  a new 
continuum 1 Z of firms is born.  The discount rate between time periods for each lender j  is simply 
the inverse of their opportunity cost of funds, 1/ ( )r j . 
 Because firms now choose whether to implement the project after receiving financing, the 
financial contract is now expressed as the following mapping: 
 :{0,1} {0, }F RI   . 
The first argument, q , indicates whether the project is undertaken by the firm, and the second argument, 
Y , is again the observed output on the project. 
Lender j  is allowed to renege on its commitment to screen contracts at 2s   and allowed to 
renegotiate screening contracts at 3s   after firms’ types become known.1  Lenders are allowed to offer 
any renegotiated contract to the firm, but it is only accepted if the new contract represents a pareto 
improvement for both the lender and firm.  Given this, firms’ decisions regarding the financial contract 
at 1s   will need to incorporate a lender 'j s optimal decision on screening investment at 2s   and 
incentives to renegotiate a screening contract at 3s  . 
Let ( )tF j  be the set of contracts initially offered by lender j  during the stage game at time t .  
                                                 
1 There is never any incentive to renegotiate unscreened contracts since no actions are made and no new information is 
learned between 1s  and 3s   for lenders of firms accepting this type of contract. 
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As before, ,,
I k
j tF  will designate a financial contract of size {0,1}I   and type {0, , , , }k Z A B C  offered by 
lender j during the stage game at time t .  Then, I will define ,,ˆ
I k
j tF  as the renegotiated contract offered at 
3s  .  Again, a contract is a mapping of observables into a payment for the firm, and the screening 
technology remains the same as before. 
Let ( )tf i designate the initial contract choice of firm of type i , during the stage game at time t  
where ( )tf i  is allowed, and let ˆ ( )tf i  represent the contract agreed upon after renegotiation.  If no 
renegotiation occurs, ˆ( ) ( )t tf i f i .  Firm 'i s investment decision during the stage game at time t  is 
given by ( )tq i .  A strategy configuration in this economy consists of the set of contracts jF  for each 
lender j L , and   ( ), | ( )f i q i f i  for each firm i E . 
Lender 'j s  screening decision during the stage game at time t  is given by ( )tS j , and a lenders’ 
strategy consists of the initial set of  contracts it offers, its screening decision, and renegotiated set of 
contracts.  As before, all actions in the stage game will be perfectly observable to all agents.   Therefore, 
each agent will condition its optimal decision based on actions taken by other agents in previous sub-
periods of the stage game.    
Moreover, each agent in the stage game at time t  will have perfect knowledge of the history of 
actions taken by all lenders prior to period t .  I will define ,j ta as the actions of lender j  during the 
stage game at time t  where , ˆ{ ( ), ( ), ( )}j t t t ta F j S j F j , and ,t j t
j L
a a

   .  Therefore, the history known 
by all agents is given by 0 1 1{ , , ..., }t th a a a  .  Lastly, define tH as the set of all possible histories, th , and 
assume that 0h  .  Since agents have knowledge of lenders’ past actions, they will also condition their 
decisions in the stage game at time t  based on the lenders’ history.   
In particular, I will assume that when firms observe a lender that has either failed to screen a 
contract in the past or renegotiated a contract in the past, the firms assign a probability 0   that the 
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lender will do so again in the future.  This will be important in that if no contract is available for firms of 
type i that provide a positive, expected return, a firm’s choice is not ( )f i   as before.  Instead, a 
firm’s next  course of action will be apply for contracts from lenders that have failed to screen their 
contracts or have renegotiated their contracts in the past on the small hope this will occur again.  These 
applications, which are ex ante unprofitable for lenders, will serve to provide a future cost to lenders that 
renegotiate contracts or fail to screen their loans.   
A strategy configuration in this economy consists of   ˆ( | ), | ( ),t tf i h q i f i h  for each i E  , 
t th H t  and      0ˆ( | ), | ( , ), , | ( , ), ,t t t t t t t t t t t t tF j h S j F h F j F i h     for each j L  and t th H .  As 
before, ( , )t t tF  is the set of firm types in period t  that accept the contract offer tF when the set of 
available financial contracts is t .  Firms actions are limited in that ( )t tf i  , where t  is the set of all 
( )tF j ’s, and {0,1}q .  Lenders actions are limited in that ( ) {0,1}S j  .  Since all agents actions at time 
t  are a function of history, th , I will suppress this notation in subsequent text.   
The expected profit of firms at time t  can be written as: 
   : {0,1}t t  
where the first argument denotes the financial contract.  The second argument is the choice to 
implement, q .  Given the above setup, the expected profit of a contract is 
  


 
   
, ,
, , ,
( , 0| ) (0, .)
( , 1| ) ( | ) (1, ) 1 ( | ) (1, 0)
I k I k
t t t
I k I k I k
t t t t
F q i F
F q i p i I F RI p i I F
  
where ( | )p i I is the probability of success for a firm of type i  with a project of size I . 
The expected future returns for lender j , 
            :{0,1} { , , , } {0,1} ( ) ( ), ( ) ,Z A B C r j j R r j  
is a function the lender’s screening decision, ( )S j , and a firm’s type, i , and decision, q .  The losses are 
limited below by the largest amount of capital a lender would ever extend,  , at opportunity cost ( )r j  
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for lender of type j .  It is then easily shown, that: 
 
 
 
 
 

 
     
       
    
     
, ,
, , ,
, ,
, , ,
, ,
, , ,
,
, ,
( ), , 0| , 2 (0, .) ( ) ( )
( ), , 1| , 2 [ ( | ) ( )] ( , 1| ) ( ) ( )
( ), , 0| , 2 (0, .)
( ), , 1| , 2 [ ( | ) ( )]
I k I k
j t j t j t
I k I k
j t j t j t
I k I k
j t j t j t
I k
j t j t
S j i q F s F S j j
S j i q F s p i I R r j I F q i S j j
S j i q F s F
S j i q F s p i I R r j I  ,,( , 1| )I kj tF q i
  
Compared to the basic model discussed in the paper, the lenders’ future expected returns from a 
given financial contract is now a function of the screening decision, ( )S j .  Moreover, it is important to 
note that the expected profits of the lender for going forward with a screening contract change after 
screening is conducted at 2s  .  The lender no longer considers the sunk cost of screening when solving 
its optimization problem.  This was also true in the more basic model but irrelevant since full 
commitment ensured lenders only optimized their contracts at 1s  .  Given this, the economy’s 
Subgame Perfect equilibrium in the repeated game is defined as: 
 
Definition of Equilibrium:  A strategy configuration, 0ˆ{ ( ), ( ), ( )}t t t tF j S j F j

  for each j L  
and t th H , and{ ( ), ( )}t tf i q i  for each i E , t th H t  constitutes an equilibrium if and only 
if for every period t  it is true that:  
1. For every ˆ ( )tf i and th , each i E  chooses ( ) {0,1}tq i   to maximize  , ˆ( , )i t f q . 
2. For every ( )tf i and th , each j L  chooses ˆ ( )tF j  to maximize 
   , ˆ( ), , ( )| ( ), 2 ( )j t t t tS j i q i F j s V j  where ( )tq i  is given by condition 1. 
3. For every ( )tf i and th , each j L chooses ( )tS j  to maximize 
   , ˆ( ), , ( )| ( ), 2 ( )j t t t t tS j i q i F j s V j  where ( )tq i  is given by condition 1, and ˆ ( )tF j  
by condition 2.  
4. For every set of contracts offered, t , and th , each i E  chooses ( )t tf i   to 
maximize   , ˆ ( ), ( )| ( )i t t t tf i q i S j  where ( )tq i  is given by condition 1, ˆ ( )tf i  by condition 
2, and ( )tS j by condition 3. 
5. For every th , each j L  chooses ( )tF j to maximize 
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     , ,( , ) ˆ( ), , ( )| ( ), 2 ( )j t t j t t t t ti F S j i q i F j s V j  where ( )tq i  is given by condition 1, 
ˆ ( )tF j  by condition 2, ( )tS j by condition 3, and ,( , )t j t ti F   by condition 4, and 
     ,( , ) ˆ( ), , ( )| ( ), 2 0j j t t t ti F S j i q i F j s di  .  
6.              , ,- ( , )1 1 ˆ( ), , ( )| ( ), 2j m mt j m m m mm t i Fm tV j S j i q i F j sr   where ( )mq i  is given by 
condition 1, ˆ ( )mF j  by condition 2, ( )mS j by condition 3, ,( , )m j m mi F   by condition 
4, and ( )mF j by condition 5 for all 1m t  . 
 
Given this definition, it can be shown that there exists an equilibrium allocation similar to that of 
the model in the paper.  Specifically, lenders will adopt strategies to always honor their initial financial 
contracts, such that ˆ ( ) ( )t tF j F j  and ( ) 1S j   for 0k  .  Therefore, the full commitment assumptions 
of the more basic model can be generated as an optimal strategy.  Since the dynamics of the economy 
with or without foreign lenders are the same, I will just state the equilibrium that exhibits a separating 
equilibrium similar to that of Section 4 under the special case where * *R r    (i.e., foreign lenders 
cannot feasibly screen average firms). I focus on this special case because it generates a simple separating 
equilibrium allocation in the open economy that demonstrates full commitment as an optimal strategy 
for both foreign and domestic lenders. 
 
Proposition A1.  If  * , there exists an equilibrium where all foreign lenders offer a financial contract of 
size  to cream firms with the following payoffs:  
 
*,
*,
( )  if 1,
( , )
0                   
C
t
R r q Y R
F q Y t
otherwise
       
  
where   *, * * /Cr r  and all firms of type i C  accept finance from a foreign lender and choose 
,
*( | , ) 1
C
tq C F h
  .  Foreign lenders never renegotiate contracts and choose ( ) 1tS j  t .  And if  r R , 
all domestic lenders offer a contract of size 1 to average firms with payoffs 
 
  if 1,
( , )
0            
A
t
R r q Y R
F q Y t
otherwise
      
  
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where  Ar r and all firms of type i A  accept finance from a domestic lender and choose 
1,( | , ) 1A tq i F h  .  Domestic lenders never renegotiate contracts and choose ( ) 1tS j  t . If  r R , 
( | )tf A h  , and ( | )tf B h  always. This is the only equilibrium allocation when  * . 
 
The proof of Proposition A1 can be found in the next section, but the intuition as to why full 
commitment by lenders is an optimal strategy is straightforward.  If a lender attempts to skimp on its 
screening in any period, it gains today but loses in the future because it destroys its reputation as a lender 
that always screens.  With its reputation gone, all bad firms will apply for the screened financial contract 
in the future driving up the lender’s costs.   The gains from not screening will be offset by these future 
losses.  Likewise, foreign lenders will refuse to renegotiate with average borrowers that take the cream 
project because this also ruins the lenders’ reputation.  Since all average firms of the future can observe 
this renegotiation and approach foreign lenders’ known for renegotiation, the gains from renegotiation 
today are outweighed by future expected losses.2  
Therefore, in a repeated game where firms approach lenders that occasionally do not screen 
projects or have shown a past willingness to renegotiate, it will always be optimal for lenders to commit 
to screening their projects and never renegotiate.   A failure to screen or showing a willingness to 
renegotiate contracts will be costly for lenders in that it may attract applicants in the future that are ex-
ante unprofitable for the lender to do business with.  Since these unwanted applicants will increase the 
lenders future costs, it will be optimal for lenders to preserve their reputation by never renegotiating or 
altering their financial contracts.  
 
A.2.2 Proof of Proposition A1 
This proof will proceed in five parts.  First, I will show that all firms are choosing the optimal 
investment decision q [condition 1 of the equilibrium].  Second, I will prove no lender has an incentive 
to renegotiate given the equilibrium contracts and investment decisions [condition 2 of the equilibrium].  
                                                 
2 Interestingly, the reputational concerns of lenders provide another rational for bank specialization that is 
complementary but different from that of Stein (2002). 
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Third, I will prove that screening after firms have accepted a contract is optimal for lenders [condition 3 
of the equilibrium].  Fourth, I will prove firms always choose the optimal contract given those available, 
lenders’ optimal screening decision, and lenders’ optimal renegotiation strategy [condition 4 of the 
equilibrium].  Fifth, I will prove that given optimal investment decisions, renegotiation decisions, 
screening decisions, and contract choices of firms, that the contracts offered are an equilibrium and 
provide zero profits [conditions 5 and 6] 
Part 1 – For all t  and th , all firms clearly choose the optimal action 1q   given the contract 
offered.  For cream firms with ,*, ,
C
j tF
 , ,*, ,( | , ) 1Cj t tq C F h   maximizes utility, and for average firms 
with 1,,
A
j tF , 1,,( | , ) 1Aj t tq A F h   clearly maximizes utility.   
Part 2 – For all t , th , and ( )tf i , no lender has an incentive to renegotiate the contract at 3s  .  
It is easy to see that there does not exist any other contract that can increase both the lender and firm’s 
expected payment, so no renegotiation is possible. 
Part 3 – Both foreign lenders and domestic lenders (when  r R ) choose to screen their 
contracts for all t  and th .  To see this, consider a foreign lender that chooses to not screen the contract 
it offers in period t  because it knows that only cream firms will select the contract in equilibrium.  By 
parts 1 and 2, we know it will never want to renegotiate the contract, and the cream firms will always 
implement the project.  Therefore, 0S   yields the firm a return of 
       *, ,( ) 0, , ( )| , 2 /j t t t j s CS j i q i F s n  in period t , where n is the number of other lenders offering 
the same contract in equilibrium.  (It avoids paying the cost  * for the /C n  firms that accept its 
contract in equilibrium.).  Because it failed to screen, however, all bad firms in all future periods will 
choose to accept this lender’s contract.  This implies    * */ ( 1)t BV r .   Therefore, for 0S  , 
       * * *, / / ( 1)j t t C BV n r , while for 1S  ,   , 0j t tV .  Therefore, the lender will not 
choose 0S  when 
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The intuition for this result is straightforward.  If the foreign lender attempts to skimp on its 
screening in any period, it gains today but loses in the future because it destroys its reputation as a lender 
that always screens.  With its reputation gone, all bad firms will apply for the screened financial contract 
in the future driving up the lenders costs.   The gains from not screening will be lower than the future 
losses when n  is high because this implies the lender finances a smaller share of the cream firms and 
hence, benefits less from not screening.  Since, there are an infinite number of foreign lenders in the 
economy competing for borrowers, i.e. n   , this condition always holds and it will never be an 
equilibrium strategy for lenders to not screen a contract where 0k  .  A similar argument can be used to 
prove that domestic lenders also never have an incentive to choose 0S  .   
 Part 4 – For every set of contracts offered, t , and th , each i E  chooses ( )t tf i   to 
maximize   , ˆ ( ), ( )| ( )i t t t tf i q i S j .  This statement is clearly true for cream firms who always get the 
highest possible return by selecting ,*, ,
C
j tF
 .  Likewise, when  r R  and 1,, Aj tF  is offered, the average 
firms maximize their utility by selecting 1,,
A
j tF .  However, if  r R , then average may want to choose 
,
*, ,
C
j tF
  if they think the contract may be renegotiated once their type becomes known at 3s  .  This is 
possible since at 3s  , after the screening cost is already sunk, the foreign lender could extract 
0R r    if it renegotiated and went ahead with a contract of  
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where 0  .  The average firm would obviously prefer this new contract over receiving no contract at 
all which is initial agreement.  Therefore, the maximum return for the lender of renegotiation at 3s   is 
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      *, ,( ), , ( )| , 2 ( ) /j t t t j t AS j i q i F s R r n .  But, by renegotiating in period t , all average firms in the 
future will choose to accept this contract because the lenders’ reputation for not renegotiating is 
destroyed.  This implies       * * *( ) / ( 1)t AV r R r .  Thus, renegotiation implies, 
          * * * *( ) / ( ) / ( 1)t t A AV R r n r R r .  A foreign lender that chooses to not renegotiate 
simply makes   , 0j t tV  because it does not provide them with a contract.  Therefore, renegotiation 
will not be optimal when,  
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 Again, the intuition is straightforward.  If the foreign lender renegotiates the contract today, it 
gains back some of its initial loss in screening the average firms that approached it, but by renegotiating 
when no other foreign lender does, it will receive all the average firms again in the next period and 
thereafter.  Average firms will know the lender has a reputation for renegotiation and approach it forever 
thereafter.  But, from the perspective of today, this yields a cost to the foreign lender because it always 
takes a loss on average firms when  * *r R .  Again, when there are many lenders and n   , this 
condition will always hold in the model and it will never be profitable for foreign lenders to renegotiate 
the contract.  Similarly, it can be shown that domestic lenders will also never have an incentive to 
renegotiate their screened contracts. 
 Part 5 – Given the lenders never find it optimal to renegotiate or not invest in the screening 
technology, the lenders are in essence ‘fully committed’ to their financial contracts.  Thus, using a similar 
approach as in the proofs of Proposition 1 and 2, it is then possible to show that these two contracts are 
equilibrium contracts in the economy following foreign entry and yield zero profits.  Additionally, using 
the same approach as in Proposition 2, it is possible to show this is the unique equilibrium allocation of 
credit. 
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